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Abstract
We provide the first protocol that solves Byzantine agreement with optimal early stopping (min{f + 2, t + 1}
rounds) and optimal resilience (n > 3t) using polynomial message size and computation.
All previous approaches obtained sub-optimal results and used resolve rules that looked only at the immediate
children in the EIG (Exponential Information Gathering) tree. At the heart of our solution are new resolve rules that
look at multiple layers of the EIG tree.
1 Introduction
In 1980 Pease, Shostak and Lamport [PSL80, LSP82] introduced the problem of Byzantine agreement, a fundamental
problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing. In this problem n processes each have some initial value and the
goal is to have all correct processes decide on some common value. The network is reliable and synchronous. If all
correct processes start with the same initial value then this must be the common decision value, and otherwise the
value should either be an initial value of one of the correct processes or some pre-defined default value.1 This should
be done in spite of at most t corrupt processes that can behave arbitrarily (called Byzantine processes). Byzantine
agreement abstracts one of the core difficulties in distributed computing and secure multi-party computation — that
of coordinating a joint decision. Pease et al. [PSL80] prove that Byzantine agreement cannot be solved for n ≤ 3t.
Therefore we say that a protocol that solves Byzantine agreement for n > 3t has optimal resilience. Fisher and Lynch
[FL82] prove that any protocol that solves Byzantine agreement must have an execution that runs for t + 1 rounds.
Dolev et al. [DRS90] prove that any protocol must have executions that run for min{f + 2, t + 1} rounds, where
f is the actual number of corrupt processes. Therefore we say that a protocol that solves Byzantine agreement with
min{f + 2, t+ 1} rounds has optimal early stopping.
The protocol of [PSL80] has optimal resilience and optimal worst case t + 1 rounds. However the message com-
plexity of their protocol is exponential. Following this result, many have studied the question of obtaining a protocol
with optimal resilience and optimal worst case rounds that uses only polynomial-sized messages (and computation).
Dolev and Strong [DS82] obtained the first polynomial protocol with optimal resilience. The problem of obtain-
ing a protocol with optimal resilience, optimal worst case rounds and polynomial-sized messages turned out to be
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1Other versions of the problem may not restrict to a value on one of the correct processes, if not all initial values are the same, or require
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surprisingly challenging. Building on a long sequence of results, Berman and Garay [BG93] presented a protocol
with optimal worst case rounds and polynomial-sized messages for n > 4t. In an exceptional tour de force, Garay
and Moses [GM93, GM98], presented a protocol for binary-valued Byzantine agreement obtaining optimal resilience,
polynomial-sized messages and min{f + 5, t + 1} rounds. We refer the reader to [GM98] for a detailed and full
account of the related work. Recently Kowalski and Moste´faoui [KM13] improved the message complexity to O˜(n3)
but their solution does not provide early stopping and requires exponential computation.
Worst case running of t+1 rounds is the best possible if the protocol is to be resilient to an adversary that controls
t processes. However, in executions where the adversary controls only f < t processes, the optimal worst case can be
improved to f+2 rounds. Berman et al. [BGP92] were the first to obtain optimal resilience and optimal early stopping
(i.e. min{f + 2, t + 1} rounds) using exponential size messages. Early stopping is an extremely desirable property
in real world replication systems. In fact, agreement in a small number of rounds when f = 0 is a core advantage of
several practical state machine replication protocols (for example [CL99] and [KAD+07] focus on optimizing early
stopping in the fault free case).
Somewhat surprisingly, after more than 30 years of research on Byzantine Agreement, the problem of obtaining
the best of all worlds is still open. There is no protocol with optimal resilience, optimal early stopping and polynomial-
sized message. The conference version of [GM98] claimed to have solved this problem but the journal version only
proves a min{f + 5, t+ 1} round protocol, then says it is possible to obtain a min{f + 3, t+ 1} round protocol and
finally the authors say they believe it should be possible to obtain a min{f + 2, t+ 1} round protocol. We could not
see how to directly extend the approach of [GM98] to obtain optimal early stopping. The main contribution of this
paper is solving this long standing open question and providing the optimal min{f + 2, t + 1} rounds with optimal
resilience and polynomial complexity. Moreover, our result applies directly for arbitrary initial values and not only to
binary initial values, as some of the previous results.
Our Byzantine agreement protocol obtains a stronger notion of multi-valued validity. If v 6= ⊥ is the decision
value then at least t + 1 correct processes started with value v. The multi-valued validity property is crucial in our
solution for early stopping with monitors. This property is also more suitable in proving that Byzantine agreement
implements an ideal world centralized decider that uses the majority value. We note that several previous solutions
(in particular [GM98]) are inherently binary and their extension to multi-valued agreement does not have the stronger
multi-valued validity property.
Theorem 1. Given n processes, there exists a protocol that solves Byzantine agreement. The protocol is resilient to
any Byzantine adversary of size t < n/3. For any such adversary, the total number of bits sent by any correct process
is polynomial in n and the number of rounds is min{f + 2, t+ 1} where f is the actual size of the adversary.
Overview of our solution. At a high level we follow the framework set by Berman and Garay [BG93]. In this
framework, if at a given round all processes seem to behave correctly then the protocol stops quickly thereafter. So if
the adversary wants to cause the protocol to continue for many rounds it must have at least one corrupt process behave
in a faulty manner in each round. However, behaving in a faulty manner will expose the process and in a few rounds
the mis-behaving process will become publicly exposed as corrupt.
This puts the adversary between a rock and a hard place: if too few corrupt processes are publicly exposed then the
protocol reaches agreement quickly, if too many corrupt process are exposed then a “monitor” framework (also called
“cloture votes”) that runs in the background causes the protocol to reach agreement in a few rounds. So the only path
the adversary can take in order to generate a long execution is to publicly expose exactly one corrupt process each
round. In the t < n/4 case, this type of adversary behavior keeps the communication polynomial.
For t < n/3 a central challenge is that a corrupt process can cause communication to grow in round i but will be
publicly exposed only in round i + 2. Naively, such a corrupt process may also cause communication to grow both
in round i and i + 1 and this may cause exponential communication blowup. Garay and Moses [GM98] overcome
this challenge by providing a protocol such that, if there are at most two new corrupt processes in round i and no
new corrupt process in round i + 1 then even though they are publicly exposed in round i + 2 they cannot increase
communication in round i+ 1 (also known as preventing “cross corruption”).
At the core of the binary-valued protocol of Garay and Moses is the property that one value can only be decided on
even rounds and the other only on odd rounds. This property seems to raise several unsolved challenges for obtaining
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optimal early stopping. We could not see how to overcome these challenges and obtain optimal early stopping using
this property. Our approach allows values to be fixed in a way that is indifferent to the parity of the round number (and
is not restricted to binary values).
Two key properties of our protocol that makes it quite different from all previous protocols. First, the value of a
node is determined by the values of its children and grandchildren in the EIG tree ([BNDDS92]). Second, if agreement
is reached on a node then the value of all its children is changed to be the value of the node. This second property is
crucial because otherwise even though a node is fixed there could be disagreement about the value of its child. Since
the value of the parent of the fixed node depends on its children and grandchildren, the disagreement on the grandchild
may cause disagreement on the parent and this disagreement could propagate to the root.
The decision to change the value of the children when their parent is fixed is non-trivial. Consider the following
scenario with a node σ, child σp and grandchild σpq: some correct reach agreement that the value of σpq is d, then
some correct reach agreement that the value of σp is d′ 6= d and hence the value of σpq is changed (colored) to d′. So
it may happen that some correct decide the value of σ based on σpq being fixed on d and some other correct decide
the value of σ based on σpq being colored to d′. Making sure that agreement is reached in all such scenarios requires
us to have a relatively complex set of complementary agreement rules.
To bound the size of the tree by a polynomial size we prove that the adversary is still between a rock and a hard
place: roughly speaking there are three cases. If just one new process is publicly exposed in a given round then the tree
grows mildly (remains polynomial). If three or more new processes are exposed in the same round then this increases
the size of the tree but can happen at most a constant number of times before a monitor process will cause the protocol
to stop quickly.
The remaining case is when exactly two new processes are exposed, then a sequence of (possibly zero) rounds
where just one new process is exposed in each round, followed by a round where no new process is exposed. This is a
generalized version of the “cross corruption” case of [GM98] where the adversary does not face increased risk of being
caught by the monitor process. We prove that in these cases the tree essentially grows mildly (remains polynomial).
In order to deal with this generalized “cross corruption” we introduce a special resolve rule (SPECIAL-BOT RULE)
tailored to this scenario. In particular, in some cases we fix the value of a node σ to ⊥ (a special default value) if
we detect enough support. This solves the generalized “cross corruption” problem but adds significant complications.
Recall that when we fix a value to a node then we also fix (color) the children of this node with the same value.
Suppose a process fixes a node σ to ⊥. The risk is that some correct processes may have used a child σp with
value d but some other correct process will see ⊥ for σp (because when σ is fixed to ⊥ we color all its children to
⊥). Roughly speaking, we overcome this difficulty by having two resolve rule thresholds. The base is the n − t
threshold (RESOLVE RULE, IT-TO-RT RULE) and the other is with a n− t− 1 threshold (RELAXED RULE). In essence
this n− t− 1 rule is resilient to disagreement on one child node (that may occur due to coloring). We then make sure
that the SPECIAL-BOT RULE can indeed change only one child value. This delicate interplay between the resolve rules
is at the core of our new approach.
The adversary. Given n > 3t and φ ≤ t, as in [GM98], we will consider a (t, φ)-adversary - an adversary that
can control up to φ corrupt processes that behave arbitrarily and at most t− φ corrupt processes that are always silent
(send some default value ⊥ to all processes every round). The (t, φ)-adversary will be useful to model executions in
which all correct processes have detected beforehand some common set of at least t− φ corrupt processes and hence
ignore them throughout the protocol. Note that the standard t-adversary is just a (t, t)-adversary.
2 The EIG structure and rules
In this section we define the EIG structure and rules.
Let N be the set of processes, n = |N | and assume that n > 3t. Let D be a set of possible decision values. We
assume some decision ⊥ ∈ D is the designated default decision.
Let Σr be the set of all sequences of length r of elements of N without repetition. Let Σ0 = ǫ, the empty sequence.
Let Σ =
⋃
0≤j≤t+1 Σj . An Exponential Information Gathering tree (EIG in short) is a tree whose nodes are elements
in Σ and whose edges connect each node to the node representing its longest proper prefix. Thus, node ǫ has n children,
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and a node from Σk has exactly n− k children.
We will typically use the Greek letter σ to denote a sequence (possibly empty) of labels corresponding to a node
in an EIG tree. We use the notation σq to denote the node in the EIG tree that corresponds to the child of node σ that
corresponds to the sequence σ concatenated with q ∈ N . We denote by ǫ¯ the root node of the tree that corresponds
to the empty sequence. Given two sequences σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, let σ′ ❁ σ denote that σ′ is a proper prefix of σ and σ′ ⊑ σ
denote that σ′ is a prefix of σ (potentially σ′ = σ).
In the EIG consensus protocol each process maintains a dynamic tree data structure IT . This data structure maps
a set of nodes in σ to values in D. Intuitively, this tree contains all the information the process has heard so far.
Each process z also maintains two global dynamic sets F ,FA. The set F contains processes that z detected as faulty,
and FA contains processes that z knows are detected by all correct processes. The protocol for updating F ,FA is
straightforward:
• In each round the processes exchange their F lists and update their F and FA sets once a faulty process appears
in t+ 1 or 2t+ 1 lists, respectively.
• When a process is detected as faulty every correct process masks its future messages to ⊥.
The basic EIG protocol will be invoked repeatedly, and several copies of the EIG protocol may be running con-
currently. The accumulated set of faulty processes will be used across all copies (the rest of the variables and data
structures are local to each EIG invocation). Therefore, we assume that when the protocol is invoked the following
property holds:
Property 1. When the protocol is invoked, no correct process appears in the faulty sets of any other correct process.
Moreover, FAp ⊆ Fp and FAp ⊆ Fq for any two correct processes p and q,
Each invocation of the EIG protocol is tagged with a parameter φ, known to all processes. An EIG protocol with
parameter φ, will run for at most φ + 1 rounds. At the beginning of the agreement protocol the faulty sets are empty
at all correct processes and the EIG protocol with parameter φ = t is executed. Each additional invocation of the
EIG protocol is with a smaller value of φ. In the non-trivial case, when the EIG protocol with parameter φ is invoked
then |
⋂
iFAi| ≥ t − φ. There will be one exception to this assumption, and it is handled in Lemma 1. Thus, other
than in that specific case, it is assumed that we have a (t, φ)-adversary during the execution of the EIG protocol with
parameter φ.
The basic EIG protocol for a correct process z with initial value dz ∈ D is very simple:
1. Init: Set IT(ǫ¯) := dz , so IT(ǫ¯) is set to be the initial value.
2. Send: in each round r, 1 ≤ r ≤ φ+1, for every σ ∈ IT∩Σr−1, such that z /∈ σ, send the message 〈σ, z, IT(σ)〉
to every process.
3. Receive set: in each round r, let Sr := {σx ∈ Σr}.
4. Receive rule: in each round r, for all σx ∈ Sr set
IT(σx) :=


⊥ if x ∈ F
d if x 6∈ F sent 〈σ, x, d〉 and d ∈ D;
IT(σ) otherwise.
Note: assigning of IT(σx) := IT(σ) when x /∈ F is crucial for the case where x is correct and has halted in the
previous round. Thus, if a process is silent but is not detected (possibly because it has halted due to early stopping) z
assigns it the value it heard in the previous round.
We use a second dynamic EIG tree data structure RT . Intuitively, if a process puts a value in a node of this tree
then, essentially, all correct processes will put the same value in the same node in at most 2 more rounds. Processes
use several rules to close branches of the IT tree whose value in RT is already determined by all. We present later the
rules for closing branches of the IT tree. To handle this, we modify lines 2 and 3 as described below (and keep lines
1 and 4 as above).
2. Send: in each round r, 1 ≤ r ≤ φ+1, for every σ ∈ IT ∩Σr−1, such that z /∈ σ, and the branch σ is not closed
send the message 〈σ, z, IT(σ)〉 to every process.
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3. Receive set: in each round r, let Sr = {σx ∈ Σr | branch σx is not closed}.
Informally, ITz(σp) = d (where ITz denotes the IT tree at process z) indicates that process z received a message
from process p that said that his value for σ was d. RTz(σp) = d indicates, essentially, that process z knows that
every correct process x will agree and have d ∈ RTx(σp) in at most two more rounds.
Observe that we record in the EIG tree only information from sequences of nodes that do not contain repetition,
therefore, not every message a process receives will be recorded.
At the end of each round, we apply the rules below to determine whether to assign values to nodes inRT , assigning
that value in RT is called resolving the node.
2.1 The Resolve Rules
A key feature of our algorithm is that whenever we put a value into RT(σ) we also color (assign) all the descendants
of σ in RT with the same value. Observe that this means we may color a node σw in RT to d even if w is correct and
sent d′ 6= d to all other correct processes.
Rules for IT-to-RT resolve: The following definitions and rules cause a node to be resolved based on information
in IT .
1. If IT(σw) = d then we say: (1)w is a voter of (σ,w, d); (2)w is confirmed on (σ,w, d); (3) For all v ∈ N\{σ},
w is a supporter of v on (σ,w, d).
Note: the reason that we count w as a voter, as confirmed and as a supporter for all its echoers is that due to the
EIG structure w does not appear in the subtree of σw.
2. If IT(σwv) = d , then we say that v is a supporter of v for (σ,w, d).
Note: again we need v to be a supporter of itself because of the EIG structure.
3. If IT(σwvu) = d then we say that u is a supporter of v for (σ,w, d).
4. If there is a set |U | = n− t, such that for each u′ ∈ U , u′ is a supporter of v on (σ,w, d) then we say that v is
confirmed on (σ,w, d).
Note: if σ contains no correct andw is correct, then any correct child v (of σw) will indeed have n−t supporters
for σw and hence will be confirmed. Note that one supporter is w, the other is v and the remaining are all the
n−t−2 correct children of σwv. Also note thatw is confirmed, so all n−t correct will be confirmed on (σ,w, d).
5. If u 6= w has a set |V | = n− t, such that for each v′ ∈ V , u is a supporter of v′ on (σ,w, d) and v′ is confirmed
on (σ,w, d) then u is a voter of (σ,w, d).
Note: this is somewhat similar to the notion of a Voter in grade-cast ([FM97, FM88]). But there is a crucial
difference: all the n− t echoers need to be confirmed. Also note that w is a voter for itself.
6. IT-TO-RT RULE: Ifw has a set |U | = n−t, such that for each u′ ∈ U , u′ is a voter of (σ,w, d) then if σw /∈ RT ,
then put RT(σw) := d and color descendants of σw with d as well.
Note: this is somewhat similar to the notion of a grade 2 in grade-cast. A crucial difference is that the n − t
voters needed are defined with respect to supported echoers. This is a non-trivial change that breaks the standard
grade-cast properties. Also note that we not only put a value in σw but also color all the descendants.
7. ROUND φ+ 1 RULE: if IT(σw) = d and σ ∈ Σt then if σw /∈ RT , then put RT(σw) := d.
Note: this is a standard rule to deal with the last round.
Rules for RT tree resolve: The following definitions and rules cause a node to be resolved based only on infor-
mation in RT (these rules do not look at IT).
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1. If there is a set |U | = t + 1, such that for each u′ ∈ U , RT(σwvu′) = d then we say v is RT-confirmed on
(σ,w, d).
Note: if any correct sees a node as confirmed then it has n − t that echo its value. At least t + 1 of them are
correct and they all cause all correct to see the node as RT-confirmed. Of course a node may become RT-
confirmed even if it was never confirmed by any correct. Observe that if RT(σwu) = d then, by coloring, u is
RT-confirmed on (σ,w, d).
2. If u 6= w has a set |V | = n− t, such that each v′ ∈ V is RT-confirmed on (σ,w, d) and for each v′ ∈ V \ {u},
RT(σwv′u) = d and if u ∈ V then also RT(σwu) = d, then u is RT-voter of (σ,w, d).
Note: if any correct process sees a node as a voter then it has n− t echoers that are confirmed. So each of these
n− t echoers will be RT-confirmed. So all correct processes will see this node as RT-voter. Of course a node
can become RT-voter even if it was never a voter at any correct process.
3. RESOLVE RULE: If w has a set |U | = t + 1, such that for each u′ ∈ U , u′ is a RT-voter of (σ,w, d) then if
σw /∈ RT , then put RT(σw) := d, and color descendants of σw with d as well. The rule applies also for node
σw = ǫ¯.
Note: if any correct process does IT-TO-RT RULE then this rule tries to guarantee that all correct processes will
also put this node in RT . The problem is that SPECIAL-BOT RULE (see below) may be applied to one of the
echoers and this may cause some of the RT-voters to lose their required support. The following rule fixes this
situation. It reduces the threshold to n− t− 1 but requires that all children nodes are fixed.
4. RELAXED RULE: If all the children of σw are inRT (i.e.,∀σwv ∈ Σ: σwv ∈ RT) and exists a set |V | = n−t−1,
such that for each v′ ∈ V , RT(σwv′) = d, then if σw /∈ RT , then put RT(σw) := d, and color descendants of
σw with d as well. The rule applies only for nodes |σw| ≥ 1.
Note: as mentioned above, the RELAXED RULE requires a threshold of n− t− 1 so that it can take into account
the possibility of one value changing to ⊥ due to the following rule:
5. SPECIAL-BOT RULE: If there is a set |V | = t+ 2− |σwu| such that for all v ∈ V , RT(σwuv) = ⊥ and for all
u′ 6= u such that σwu′ ∈ Σ, σwu′ ∈ RT then if σwu /∈ RT , then put RT(σwu) := ⊥, and color descendants
of σwu with ⊥ as well. The rule applies only for |σwu| ≥ 2.
Note: This rule can be applied to at most one child.
6. SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE: If exists a set |U | = t + 1 such that for each u ∈ U , RT(u) = ⊥ then if ǫ¯ /∈ RT ,
then put RT(ǫ¯) := ⊥, and color descendants of ǫ¯ with ⊥ as well.
Note: this rule is important in order to stop quickly if t+ 1 correct processes start with the value ⊥.
To prevent the data structures from expanding too much processes close branches of the tree, and from that point
on they do not send messages related to the closed branches. We use the notation {σ ∈ RT [r]} to denote an indicator
variable that equals true if RT(σ) was assigned some value by the end of round r, and false otherwise.
Branch Closing and Early Resolve rules: There are three rules to close a branch in IT two of them also trigger
an early resolve. By the end of round r, r ≤ φ,
1. DECAY RULE: if ∃σ′ ⊑ σ such that σ′ ∈ RT [r − 1], then close the branch σ ∈ IT .
Note: this is the simple case: if a process already fixed the value of σ′ in RT in round r − 1 then it stops in the
end of round r, since by the end of round r + 1 all correct processes will put σ′ in RT (and will interpret this
process’s silence in the right way during round r + 1). There is no need to continue. Coloring will fix all the
values of this subtree.
2. EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE: if σ ∈ Σr−1 and exists U ⊆ N , U ∩{u′ | u′ ∈ σ} = ∅, |U | = n−r, such that for every
u, v ∈ U \ F , IT(σu) = IT(σv), then if σ /∈ RT , then put RT(σ) := IT(σ) and close the branch σ ∈ IT .
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Note: this is a case where the process can forecast that all correct processes will put σ in RT in the next round
(because the process sees that all children nodes agree). So the process can fix σ in this round and stop now, be-
cause all correct processes will fix σ in RT next round (and will interpret this process’s silence in the right way).
3. STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE: if σ ∈ Σr−2 and exists U ⊆ N , U ∩ {u′ | u′ ∈ σ} = ∅, |U | = n − r + 1 such that
for every u, v ∈ U \ F , where v 6= u, IT(σuv) = IT(σvu) then, if σ /∈ RT , then put RT(σ) := IT(σ) and
close the branch σ ∈ IT .
Note: in this case all the correct children of σ except for at most one will be fixed in the next round to the same
value, so the RELAXED RULE will be applied to σ in the next round. So we can fix σ in this round and stop now.
In each round all the above rules are applied repeatedly until none holds any more.
The rules above imply that there are two ways to give a value to a node in RT . One is assigning it a value using
the various rules, and the other is coloring it as a result of assigning a value to one of its predecessors. We will use the
term color for the second one and the term put for the first one.
Rules for fault detection and masking: The following definitions and rules are used to detect faulty processes,
put them into F and hence mask them (all messages from F are masked to ⊥). The last rule also defines an additional
masking. The process first updates its F and FA sets using the sets received from the other processes during the
current round. A process is added to F or FA once it appears in t + 1 or 2t + 1 sets, respectively. Next the process
applies the following fault detection rules. The fault detection is executed before applying any of the resolve rules
above. When a new process is added to F , the new masking is applied and the fault detection is repeated until no new
process can be added. Only then the resolve rules above are applied.
At process z by the end of round r:
1. Not Voter: If ∃σw ∈ Σr−1 and w 6= z and 6 ∃σ′ ⊑ σw such that σ′ ∈ RT and it is not the case that there exists
a set |U | = n− t− 1 such that for each u′ ∈ U , IT(σwu′) = IT(σw) then add w to F .
Note: this is the standard detection rule after one round - if anything looks suspicions then detect.
2. Not IT-to-RT: If ∃σw ∈ Σr−2 for which w does not have a set |U | = n− t, such that for each u′ ∈ U , u′ is a
voter of (σ,w, d), and 6 ∃σ′ ⊑ σ such that σ′ ∈ RT then add w to F .
Note: this is the standard detection rule after two rounds - if anything looks suspicions then detect.
3. If u, u 6= w, has a set |V | = n − t, such that for each v′ ∈ V , u is a supporter of v′ on (σ,w, d) then we say
that u is an unconfirmed voter of (σ,w, d).
Note: the notion of an unconfirmed voter is exactly that of a voter in the standard grade-cast protocol.
4. If w has a set |U | = t+ 1, such that for each u′ ∈ U , u′ is an unconfirmed voter of (σ,w, d) then we say that
σw is leaning towards d.
Note: the notion of leaning towards is exactly that of getting grade ≥ 1 in the standard grade-cast protocol.
5. Not Masking: If σw ∈ Σr−3 is leaning towards d and there exists u, |V | = t+1, and d′ 6= d such that for each
v′ ∈ V , IT(σwuv′) = d′ and there exists |σ′′| > |σ| such that IT(σ′′wu) 6= ⊥ then
(a) IT(σ′′wu) = ⊥;
(b) if by the end of the round 6 ∃σ′ ⊑ σ′′w such that σ′ ∈ RT then add u to F .
Note: If σw is leaning towards d then u must have heard at least t+1 say d on σw. If t+1 say u said d′ then u
must have said d′ to some correct. So u must have received d′ from σw but in the next round u hears t + 1 say
σw said d. So u must conclude that w is faulty and u must mask him from the next round. If u did not mask
some σ′′wu then the Not Masking rule will detect u as faulty and mask all such σ′′wu for you and also mark
you as faulty. The reason we wait until the end of the round to add that node to F is that it might be a node of
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a correct process that stopped in the previous round and hence did not send any messages in the current round,
and therefore did not send masking. In such a case we mask its virtual sending, but do not add it to F .
Finalized Output: By the end of each round (after applying all the resolve rules), the process checks whether there
is a frontier in RT . A frontier (also called a cut) is said to exist if for all σ ∈ Σφ+1 there exists some sub-sequence
σ′ ⊑ σ such that σ′ ∈ RT .
1. Early Output rule: By the end of a round, if ǫ¯ ∈ RT , output RT(ǫ¯).
2. Final Output rule: Otherwise, if there is a frontier, output ⊥.
Observe that the existence of a frontier can be tested from the current IT in O(|IT|) time.
Stopping rule: If all branches of IT are closed, stop the protocol.
3 The Consensus Protocol Analysis
The EIG protocol implicitly presented in the previous section is a consensus protocol Dφ, where φ, 1 ≤ φ ≤ t is
a parameter. Protocol Dφ runs for at most φ + 1 rounds and solves Byzantine agreement against a (t, φ)-adversary.
Denote by G the set of correct processes, |G| ≥ n− t, where n = |N |, and by S, S =
⋂
q∈G Fq, the set of processes
that are masked to ⊥ by all correct processes. Let s := |S|.
Our solution invokes several copies of the EIG protocol. For each invoked protocol,Dφ, there are two cases: either
s ≥ t− φ, or we are guaranteed that the input of all correct processes that start the protocol is the same (in particular,
it may be that some correct processes have halted and do not start the protocol). The following lemma deals with this
latter case.
Lemma 1. [Validity and Fast Termination] For any (t, t)-adversary, and n ≥ 3t+ 1,
1. if every correct process that starts the protocol holds the same input value d then d is the output value of all
correct processes that start the protocol, by the end of round 2, and all of them complete the protocol by the end
of round 3.
2. if all correct processes start the protocol and t + 1 correct processes start with ⊥ then all correct processes
output ⊥ by the end of round 3 and stop the protocol by the end of round 4.
3. For p, q ∈ G, no p will add q to Fp in either of the above cases.
Proof. To prove the first item, let us follow the protocol. Let G1 be the set of correct processes that start the protocol
and let G2 = G \G1, be the remaining correct processes that remain silent throughout the protocol.
Initially, for every z ∈ G1, ITz(ǫ¯) = dz.
In the 1st round every correct process z ∈ G1 sends 〈ǫ¯, z, dz〉 to every process. By the end of the 1st round,
every correct process applies the receive rule for all the other processes. Thus, every correct process z ∈ G1 has
ITz(x) := dx, for every x ∈ G, since it completes the missing values from correct processes in G2 to be its own
input value. Thus, the receive rule assigns at each z ∈ G1, ITz(σx) := ITz(σ) for a missing value by x ∈ G2 for σ.
EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, may be applied by some correct processes at the end of the first round, and as a result will put
RT(ǫ¯) = d and will output d.
Since ITz(x) = d for all x ∈ G, by the end of the 1st round, every z ∈ G1 sees every x ∈ G as supporter of x for
(ǫ¯, ǫ¯, d).
In the 2nd round, every correct process z ∈ G1 that did not apply EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of the 1st
round, sends 〈x, z, d〉 for every process x ∈ G to every process. Again, if any correct process did not send a message,
its missing value for any x ∈ G will be assigned the same value at all correct processes. Notice that some additional
correct processes may not send in the second round.
By the end of the 2nd round, after applying the receive rule, at each z ∈ G1 that did not apply EARLY IT-TO-RT
RULE by the end of the 1st round, ITz(xy) = d for every x, y ∈ G. Thus, for every such x, every y ∈ G \ {x}, is a
supporter of x for (ǫ¯, ǫ¯, d). As a result, for the set |G| = n− t, for each u′ ∈ G, u′ is a supporter of v for (ǫ¯, ǫ¯, d), for
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every v ∈ G. Therefore, every v ∈ G is confirmed on (ǫ¯, ǫ, d). Therefore, every process z ∈ G1, that did not apply
EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of the 1st round, sees every process x ∈ G as a voter of (ǫ¯, ǫ¯, d). This implies that
it can apply the IT-TO-RT RULE and will put RT(ǫ¯) = d, will output d, and will stop the protocol by the end of round
3.
For the second claim: by the end of the 1st round, every correct process z has ITz(x) := ⊥, for at least t + 1
processes x ∈ G. Let A = {x | x ∈ G & dx = ⊥}. If ⊥ was the input value to all correct processes, we are done by
the previous claim. Otherwise, no correct process will apply EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE to a value that is not ⊥.
In the 2nd round, every correct process z sends 〈x, z, dx〉 for every process x ∈ G to every process. By the end of
the 2nd round, after applying the receive rule, at each z ∈ G, ITz(xy) = dx, for every x, y ∈ G. Thus, every process
z ∈ G sees each process v ∈ A both as supporter of v for (ǫ¯, v,⊥), and also as supporter of u for (ǫ¯, v,⊥) for every
u ∈ G.
In the 3rd round, every correct process z sends 〈vx, z,⊥〉 for every process v ∈ A and x ∈ G to every process.
If any correct process applied EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE in the previous round, then its missing value regarding other
correct processes will be identical at all correct processes. By the end of the 3rd round, after applying the receive
rule, at each z ∈ G, ITz(vxy) = ⊥, for every v ∈ A, and x, y ∈ G. Thus, every process z ∈ G sees every process
u ∈ G \ {v} as a supporter of u′ for (ǫ¯, v,⊥), for every u′ ∈ G \ {v} and v ∈ A. For every such v and u′, v is also a
supporter of u′ for (ǫ¯, v,⊥). Thus, every such u′ is confirmed on (ǫ¯, v,⊥), for every v ∈ A. Moreover, by definition,
every such v is also confirmed on (ǫ¯, v,⊥).
As a result, every process z ∈ G sees every process u ∈ G as a voter to (ǫ¯, v,⊥), for every v ∈ A. Thus, v ∈ RTz
for every v ∈ A. Thus, it can apply the SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE and will put RT(ǫ¯) = ⊥ by the end of round 3,
and will stop by the end of round 4.
To prove the 3rd claim, observe that the fault detection rules can be applied only in rounds 2 or 3. If a correct
process did not send any message in round 2, it is because of applying EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, and it’s missing values
will not cause any other correct process to be suspected as a faulty process, neither the correct process that did not
send. By the end of the 2nd round ǫ¯ will be in RTq for every q ∈ G, and no one will apply any fault detection rules
anymore.
If all correct processes participated in round 2, then Not-Voter will not apply to any correct process. If any correct
process did not send any message in round 3, it’s missing values will not harm any correct process or itself and all
correct processes will be in RT by the end of the round. For similar reasons, the Not-Masking rule will not cause any
correct process to be added to F .
The only case in which not all correct processes invoke a Dφ protocol is when some of the background running
monitors are being invoked by some of the correct processes, while others may have already stopped. This special case
is guaranteed to be when the inputs of all participating correct processes is ⊥, and consensus can be still be achieved.
Lemma 1 implies the following:
Corollary 1. For any (t, t)-adversary, and n ≥ 3t + 1, if every correct process that invokes the protocol start with
input⊥, then ⊥ is the output value at each participating correct process by the end of round 2, and each participating
correct process completes the protocol by the end of round 3. Moreover, for p, q ∈ G, no p will add q to Fp.
The gossip exchange among correct processes about identified faults ensures the following:
Lemma 2. For a (t, φ)-adversary and protocol Dφ, n ≥ 3t+ 1, assuming Property 1, for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ φ + 1, by
the end of round k, for every two correct processes p, q, FAp ⊆ Fq and FAp[k − 1] ⊆ FAp[k].
Proof. Prior to invocation the claim holds by Property 1. In each round processes exchange their F sets. If a process
finds out that some process b appears in the lists of at least t + 1 processes it adds b to F , and if it appears in 2t + 1
lists it adds it to both F and FA. The F and FA sets are never decreased, and FA is updated only through gossiping.
Therefore, it is easy to see that by the end of each round the claim holds.
A node may initially assign a value using one of the “put” rules and later it may color it to a different value. In
the arguments below we sometimes need to refer to the value that was put to a node rather than the value it might be
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colored to. Once a node has a value it is not assigned a value using any put rule any more. Thus, the value assigned
using a put rule is an initial value that may be assigned to a node before it is colored, or that node may never have a
value put to it. To focus on these put operations, we will add, for proof purposes, that whenever a node p uses a put
rule for some σ, except ROUND φ + 1 RULE, it also puts σ in PTp (The “Put-Tree”) and as a result at that moment,
PTp(σ) = RTp(σ). We do not color nodes in PTp, thus for σ that is colored, but was not assigned a value prior to
that, PTp(σ) is undefined. We exclude ROUND φ+ 1 RULE from PT on purpose.
The following is the core statement of the technical properties of the protocol. The only way we found to prove all
these is via an induction argument that proves all properties together. The theorem contains four items.
The detection part proves that correct processes are never suspected as faulty. The challenge is that the various
rules instruct processes when to stop sending messages, and that might cause other correct processes to be suspected
as faulty.
The validity part proves that if a correct process sends a value, it will reach the RT of every other correct process
within two rounds. It also proves that if a correct process decides not to send a value (thus, closed a branch), the
appropriate node will be in RT of every correct process. The third claim in the validity part is that if a process appears
in FA, then it appears in RT of every correct process within two rounds.
The safety part intends to prove consistency in the RT . The challenge is that coloring may cause the trees of
correct processes to defer. Therefore the careful statements looks at PT , and which rule was used in order to assign
the value to it. The⊥ value is a default value, therefore there is a special consideration of whether the value the process
puts is ⊥ or not. The end result is that if a node appears in PT of two correct processes, it carries the same value.
The liveness part shows that if a node appears in RT of a correct process, it will appear in RT of any other correct
process within two rounds.
Theorem 2. For a (t, φ)-adversary and protocol Dφ, n ≥ 3t+ 1, assuming Property 1 and that all correct processes
participate in the protocol, then for any 1 ≤ k ≤ φ+ 1 :
1. No False Detection: For p, q ∈ G, no q will add p to Fq in round k.
2. Validity:
(a) For σ ∈ Σk−3 if p ∈ G, sends 〈σ, p, dp〉, then at the end of round k, at every correct process x, either
RTx(σp) = dp or ∃σ′ ❁ σ such that σ′ ∈ RTx. For k = φ+1, the property holds also for any σ ∈ Σk−2
and for any σ ∈ Σk−1.
(b) If z ∈ FA in the beginning of round k − 2, then by the end of round k, at every correct process, either
RT(σz) = ⊥ or ∃σ′ ❁ σ such that σ′ ∈ RT . For k = φ + 1, the property holds for z ∈ FA in the
beginning of rounds k − 1 or k.
(c) For σ ∈ Σk−1, if p ∈ G, does not send 〈σ, p, d〉 for any d ∈ D, then at the end of round k, at every correct
process x, ∃σ′ ❁ σ such that σ′ ∈ RTx.
3. Safety: For p, q ∈ G, x ∈ N , |σx| ≤ φ,σx ∈ PTp[k], then
(a) if p applies RESOLVE RULE to put PTp(σx) = d, d 6= ⊥, and v is one of the RT-confirmed nodes
on (σ, x, d) in RTp used in applying this rule in RTp, and in addition PTq(σxv) = ⊥, then q applied
SPECIAL-BOT RULE to put σxv;
(b) if |σx| ≥ 1 and PTp(σx) = d, d 6= ⊥, then, by the end of round k, |Vq | ≤ t, where Vq = {u |
PTq(σxu) = ⊥};
(c) if |σx| ≥ 1 and PTp(σx) = ⊥ and it wasn’t put using SPECIAL-BOT RULE, then, by the end of round k,
|Vq| ≤ t, where Vq = {u | PTq(σxu) 6= ⊥};
(d) if σx ∈ PTq[k], then PTp(σx) = PTq(σx).
4. Liveness: For p, q ∈ G, if σ ∈ RTp[k − 2] then σ ∈ RTq[k]. For k = φ+ 1, if σ ∈ RTp then σ ∈ RTq.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the theorem by induction on k. We first prove the theorem assuming φ > 1 and will
conclude by proving the theorem for the case φ = 1.
As the proof is quite complex, we split it into three ranges, k = 1, k ≤ φ − 1, and k ≤ φ + 1. We will prove the
following claims, where each handles the appropriate range:
10
Claim 1. Theorem 2 holds for k = 1.
The general case. This is where most of the technical challenge lies:
Claim 2. Theorem 2 holds for 1 < k ≤ φ− 1.
The final two rounds, when the resolve rules are slightly different:
Claim 3. Theorem 2 holds for φ− 1 < k ≤ φ+ 1.
Proof of Claim 1. We will prove each of the four items separately.
Proof of Item 1 for Claim 1. (Detection) By the end of round 1, a process may add another to F only through gossip-
ing. Property 1 implies that no correct process will suspect any other correct process. The rest of the fault detection
rules are not applicable in the first round.
Proof of Item 2 for Claim 1. (Validity) For k = 1, Statement 2c and Statement 2b vacuously hold, since there was
no such round. For proving Statement 2a observe that in the first round only EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE is applicable.
Assume that a correct process p ∈ G applies EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of round 1, thus node σ is ǫ¯, since
σ = ǫ. This implies that for every x ∈ N \ Fp, ITp(x) = d. Since G ∩ Fp = ∅, we conclude that for every correct
process q, dq = d, and by the end of the 2nd round, by Lemma 1, all correct processes will have RT(ǫ¯) = d = dp and
we are done.
Proof of Item 3 for Claim 1. (Safety) Only Statement 3d is applicable for k = 1. Notice that the only case in which
σx ∈ PTp[1] is when p applies EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE in the end of the 1st round and as a result puts some value d to
the root node in its RTp. In such a case, it is clear that if σ ∈ PTq[1] then PTp(σ) = PTq(σ).
Proof of Item 4 for Claim 1. (Liveness) This item vacuously holds.
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Now we move to proving the main part of the theorem.
Proof of Claim 2. The proof is by induction. The base case is Claim 1. Assume correctness for any k′′, 1 ≤ k′′ < k,
and we will prove the claim for k, k ≤ φ− 1.
Proof of Item 1 for Claim 2. (Detection) The fault detection takes place in every round before any resolve rule is
applied. By induction we know that a correct process will not add another correct process to F using gossiping
from other processes. The three rules to add a process to F are based on the messages accumulated in IT . The
induction on k − 1 allows us to determine what messages correct processes will be sending in round k.
Let round k be the first round at which a process p is not sending messages related to the branch of σ. There
are three cases in which a correct process, p, stops sending, by using DECAY RULE, EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE and
STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE. If p closes the branch of σ at the end of round k − 1 and is not sending messages related to
it in round k, the receive rule instructs correct processes what values to add to their IT .
Let’s consider the three fault detection rules. Not-Voter is not applicable, since in the previous round p sent its
messages appropriately. Since p is correct every correct process that sends messages echo’s the message it sent, and
whenever a correct process applies the receiving rule to assign messages to processes that did not send messages in
the current round it adds the message p originally sent. For the similar reason Not-IT-to-RT is not applicable.
The last fault detection rule is Not-Masking. Assume that a correct process q is expecting process p to mask away
some process w. The Not-Masking rule allows q to mask the non-sending by ⊥, but q will not add p to F if by the
end of the round q will have ∃σ′ ⊑ σ′′w such that σ′ ∈ RT . Thus, p will not be in F during the processing of all the
rules below. Statement 2c that is proved next guarantees that also by the end of the round a correct process p will not
be added to F .
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Proof of Item 2 for Claim 2. (Validity)
For Statement 2a, the case of k = φ+1 is excluded for now. Assume that p sends 〈σ, p, dp〉 in round k− 2. If any
correct process x is not sending a message 〈σ, x, dx〉, then by the protocol it should have set either σ′ ∈ PTx[k − 4]
(if used DECAY RULE) or σ′ ∈ PTx[k − 3] (if used EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE) for some
σ′ ❁ σ, and we are done by induction (Statement 3d). If there is a correct node x ∈ σ, then the claim holds by
induction (Statement 2a). So we are left with the case that no correct node appears in σ and all correct processes are
participating in round k − 2. By the end of round k − 2 every correct process x will apply the receiving rule and will
have ITx(σp) = dp.
If any correct, x (x 6= p), doesn’t send a message 〈σp, x, dp〉 then we are done by induction, using similar argument
as above. Therefore, by the end of round k−1, every correct process will apply the receiving rule and will have n−t−1
children nodes for p in its IT . Thus, by the end of round k − 1, for every x ∈ G, at every y ∈ G, x is a supporter of x
for (σ, p, dp). And for every x, y ∈ G, where x 6= y 6= v, ITx(σpy) = dp. In round k some correct process (including
p) may not send messages and all the rest will send identical value dp messages. The above implies that the receiving
rule will assign to each correct process that does not send messages the identical value d at every correct process that
still process messages for this branch.
As we argued before, since p itself is confirmed on each node it echoes, every correct process will be a voter and
therefore, by the end of round k, at every correct process x ∈ G, that still process messages for this branch either
RTx(σp) = dp, or ∃σ′ ❁ σp such that σ′ ∈ RTx.
The proof of Statement 2b is identical to the above, as if it is the case of a correct process sending ⊥.
Proving Statement 2c: Let σ ∈ Σk−1 and p ∈ G. If p does not send any message 〈σ, p, d〉 for any d ∈ D in round
k, then either the branch was closed earlier and we are done by induction, or this is the first round any correct process
doesn’t send a message on this branch. Thus, p applied DECAY RULE, EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE or STRONG IT-TO-RT
RULE by the end of round k − 1.
We will cover each of the closing rules separately.
Proving the claim in case p ∈ G uses DECAY RULE: by definition ∃σ′ ❁ σ such that σ′ ∈ RTp[k − 2], which
results in closing the branch by the end of round k − 1 and not sending in round k. If ∃σ′′ ❁ σ, σ′′ ∈ RTp[k − 3],
then we are done by induction. Otherwise, it must be because of messages received in round k− 2. All such messages
are reflected in ITp. To influence a σ′ ∈ RTp, it should be as a result of applying IT-TO-RT RULE, ROUND φ + 1
RULE, EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE. Since k − 2 6= φ + 1, we conclude that it is not a result
of applying ROUND φ + 1 RULE. If it is a result of p applying EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE
in round k − 2 then this branch would be closed already be the end of round k − 1 and we are done by induction.
Similarly, if any other correct process closed the branch by the end of round k − 2, we are done by induction.
Assume now the case that it is a result of p’s using IT-TO-RT RULE. Thus, there should be some σ¯w, such that
σ′ ⊆ σ¯, σ¯w ∈ Σk−4 and p applied IT-TO-RT RULE in round k− 2 to put it in RTp (and PTp, for proof purposes). Let
d be the value assigned by p to PTp(σ¯w) as a result of processing ITp by the end of round k− 2.. If there is a correct
node in σ¯w, we are done by induction. Since this is not the case, then when p applied IT-TO-RT RULE it observed a set
U of n− t processes in ITp that are voters of (σ¯, w, d), of which at least t+ 1 are correct processes. Let U¯ be the set
of correct voters in U .
For each voter v ∈ U¯ there is a set of Wv of n− t processes that are confirmed on (σ¯, w, d), where v is a supporter
to each u ∈Wv on (σ¯, w, d). Since we assume that there is no correct nodes in σ¯w, v 6= w.
By definition, for each u ∈ Wv \ {w, v}, ITp(σ¯wuv) = d, and since v ∈ G and no correct process closed the
branch or stopped sending yet, then by the end of round k− 2, for every x ∈ G \ {u, v}, ITx(σ¯wuv) = d. If v ∈Wv ,
then all will also have ITx(σ¯wv) = d.
For u ∈ G, since σ¯w ∈ Σk−4, by induction, RTx(σ¯wuv) = d, or ∃σ′ ❁ σ¯wuv such that σ′ ∈ RTx, at every
x ∈ G.
For u 6∈ G, by the end of round k− 1, for every x ∈ G, at every y ∈ G, x is a supporter of x for (σ¯wu, v, d). And
for every x, y ∈ G, where x 6= y 6= v, ITx(σ¯wuvy) = d. In round k some correct process (including p) may not send
messages and all the rest will send identical value d messages. The above implies that the receiving rule will assign
to each correct process that does not send messages the identical value d at every correct process that still process
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messages for this branch.
As we argued before, since v itself is confirmed on each node it echoes, every correct node will be a voters and
therefore, by the end of round k, at every correct process x ∈ G, that still process messages for this branch, and for
every u ∈ Wv , either RTx(σ¯wuv) = d, or ∃σ′ ❁ σ¯wuv such that σ′ ∈ RTx.
Now observe that each u ∈ Wv , being confirmed on (σ¯, w, d), has a set Uu of n − t of supporters in ITp of u
for (σ¯, w, d) (one of which is u itself). Let U¯u be the set of correct processes in Uu. By definition, for each u ∈ Wv ,
ITp(σ¯wu) = d and for each u′ ∈ U¯u \ {u}, ITp(σ¯wuu′) = d. Since no correct process closed the brach or stopped
sending, at every x ∈ G, ITx(σ¯wuu′) = d, and if u ∈ G, then ITx(σ¯wu) = d. Thus, by the end of round k, at every
correct process x ∈ G \ {u, u′}, that still process messages for this branch, PTx(σ¯wuu′) = d, where u ∈ Wv , and
u′ ∈ U¯u \{u}. Thus, each u ∈ Wv , is RT-confirmed on (σ¯, w, d) and each v ∈ U¯ is RT-voter on (σ¯, w, d). The same
holds, by definition, for u and u′ if they did not closed the branch earlier. This implies that such x will apply RESOLVE
RULE to assign PTx(σ¯w) = d (or would observe by that time ∃σ′ ❁ σ¯w such that σ′ ∈ RTx), which completes the
proof for this case.
Proving the claim in case p ∈ G uses EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE: Assume that a correct process p ∈ G applies
EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of round k − 1. Let σ ∈ Σk−2 and denote σ = τu. The assumption of p’s
closing the branch implies, among other things, that for every x, y ∈ N \ Fp, such that τux, τuy ∈ Σk, ITp(τux) =
ITp(τuy) = d, for some d ∈ D, and thus PTp(τu) = d. This also implies that every correct process x that applies
the receiving rule in round k will assign ITx(σp) = ITx(σ) = d. If there is any correct process in τ , we are done by
induction (Statement 2a on k− 1, since the correct processes sent in k− 3 or earlier). If this is not the case, whether u
is correct or not, we conclude that by the end of round k− 1 every correct process x ∈ G will have ITx(τuy) = d for
every y ∈ G \ {u, x}, and if u ∈ G then also ITx(τu) = d. This is true since by Lemma 2, and Item 1, G ∩ Fq = ∅.
Thus, by the end of round k every correct process x that did not close the branch will use IT-TO-RT RULE to obtain
RTx(τu) = d (or would observe by that time ∃σ′ ❁ τu such that σ′ ∈ RTx), and we are done.
Proving the claim in case p ∈ G uses STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE: Assume that p applies STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE by
the end of round k−1. If there is a correct process in σ, we are done by induction. If ∃σ′ ⊑ σ such that σ′ ∈ RTq[k−1]
for any correct q, we are also done. Otherwise, let σ ∈ Σk−3. By definition there exists U , U ∩σ = ∅, |U | = n−r+2
such that for every u, v ∈ U \ F , where v 6= u, ITp(σuv) = ITp(σvu). Let x be the node such that σx ∈ Σ, but
x 6∈ U ∪ F . Since we assume that there is no correct process in σ, G ⊆ U ∪ {x}. Assume first that x is not correct.
If this is the case, then the assumption on U implies that all members of U are supporters and voters and by the end
of round k − 1, σ would be in RT of every correct process. If this is not the case, we are left with the option that x is
correct but doesn’t agree with some of the values all members of U sent. Denote by U¯ the correct member of U , and it
is clear that |U¯ | = n− t− 1 and |U | ≥ n− t. The definition of the set U implies that by the end of round k− 1, either
p puts σ in PTp, or ∃σ′ ❁ σ such that σ′ ∈ RTp. Moreover, by induction, for every member u of U¯ , σu ∈ RTq of
every correct process q by the end of round k. Thus, by the end of round k every correct process q that doesn’t already
have σ ∈ RTq will be able to apply RELAXED RULE to put σ¯ ∈ RTq, and we are done.
Proof of Item 3 for Claim 2. (Safety) Notice that when a process p puts a value to a node σx, say in round k, then at
that point in time 6 ∃σ′ ❁ σ, such that σ′ ∈ RTp[k].
Observe that if both p and q put values to σx prior to round k, then the claims hold by induction on k. Therefore
we limit ourselves to nodes which value q puts in its PT in round k and p had put a value to that node in its PT in
some round k′ ≤ k. Moreover, we limit ourselves to the case where no correct process had put a value to that node in
its PT in any round k′′ < k′.
We prove Item 3 by backward induction on the length ℓ = |σx| from ℓ = k to 1. For each ℓ we will go through
all the put rules p could have applied in setting the value to σx in round k or earlier, and for each rule we consider the
relevant rules q could have apply, and we will prove that the four statements hold in each case.
The rules to put a value to a node in RT (and PT) are: 1) IT-TO-RT RULE, 2) RESOLVE RULE, 3) RELAXED RULE,
4) SPECIAL-BOT RULE, 5) SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE, 6) EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, 7) STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE and 8)
ROUND φ+ 1 RULE.
The case ℓ = k: A node of level k, where k ≤ φ, cannot be put in PT by the end of round k.
The case 1 ≤ ℓ < k: let |σx| = ℓ and assume correctness for every ℓ′ > ℓ . Since k < φ, ROUND φ + 1 RULE is
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not applicable.
If there is a correct predecessor in σ, we are done by Item 2, since by the end of round ℓ + 1 process q will have
σx ∈ RTq (due to coloring), hence no node σxu will be in PTq and all four statements clearly hold.
Otherwise, if process x is correct, by Item 2, by the end of ℓ + 2 process q will have σx ∈ RTq . A node σxu can
be in PTq only if q applied EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE in that round, so any such node will
also be set to the value of σx, which is the same at both p and q, thus all four statements hold.
Otherwise, there is no correct process in σx. Thus, node x has n − ℓ children nodes, out of which at least n − t
are correct and out of the t− ℓ others, at most φ− ℓ are actively faulty and at lease t− φ are silent.
We start by proving the first three statements and after that we will prove the fourth statement.
➤ Consider the case that p used RESOLVE RULE to put σx: RESOLVE RULE implies that there are t+1RT-voters.
Each RT-voter has a set of n− t children nodes RT-confirmed for (σ, x, d′). Define, in such a case, by Vp the set of
children nodes of σx that are RT-confirmed to d′ in PTp. By definition, each confirmed node in Vp has t+1 children
nodes in RTp with the same value d′.
Proof of Statement 3a of Item 3 for Claim 2. By definition, confirmed is defined for ℓ + 2 ≤ k < φ + 1. For node v
beingRT-confirmed implies that there is a set Vd, such that for each v′ ∈ Vd, RTp(σxvv′) = d, where |Vd| = t+1. If
σxv ∈ RTp when p puts σx, then also σxv ∈ PTp, otherwise σx should be inRTp already. Moreover, if σxv ∈ RTp,
it should be that RTp(σxv) = d, otherwise, by coloring, RTp(σxvv′) would also not be equal d. By induction, level
ℓ + 1, Statement 3d, we conclude that q can’t put σxv to ⊥. Therefore, it should be the case that when p puts σx to
PTp, σxv 6∈ PTp. In such a case, all children nodes of σxv that are in RTp are in PTp. Specifically, every v′ ∈ Vd is
in PTp. This also implies that v 6∈ G. By induction, on level ℓ+ 2, Statement 3d, we conclude that for every v′ ∈ Vd,
if σxvv′ ∈ RTq then PTp(σxvv′) = PTq(σxvv′) = d.
Node v has exactly n − ℓ − 1 children nodes. When q puts a value to node σxv, all children nodes of node σxv
are not colored. There are at most n− ℓ− 1− (t+ 1) < n− t children nodes of σxv in PTq that are not in Vd.
Look at the rules q may use in order to put σxv to ⊥.
— Consider the case that q used IT-TO-RT RULE to put σxv to ⊥: If q applies IT-TO-RT RULE, then it should
have for each voter e a set Ue of n − t processes confirmed on (σx, v,⊥) in ITq . There is at least one process in
the intersection of Ue and Vd. Denote it by u, u ∈ Ue ∩ Vd. Observe that the definition of Vd implies that u 6= v.
Being confirmed implies that u has a set of at least t + 1 correct processes Uu such that ITq(σxvuu′) = ⊥ for
every u′ ∈ Uu. For any such u′ that sends messages in this round, ITp(σxvuu′) = ⊥. If there is u′ that closed
the branch using DECAY RULE, then it did so before round k − 2, and we are done by induction. Otherwise it
used EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE and both q and p would assign it the same value, and therefore we also conclude that
ITp(σxvuu′) = ⊥. If it used STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE, then there is a set U ′ of at least t+ 1 correct processes such
that ITp(σxvuu′) = ITq(σxvuu′) = ⊥, since all but one send the same value, and q saw n− t of them.
We now argue that if p has such a set of children node, it implies that if σxvu ∈ PTp, then PTp(σxvu) = ⊥.
Consider the various put rules p can use to put a value to PTp(σxvu). Thus, if p uses EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE in
round ℓ+3 it should be to the value ITp(σxvu) = ⊥. If p applies IT-TO-RT RULE in round ℓ+4 it should be the case
that ITp(σxvu) = ⊥. By the end of round ℓ + 5, all the correct children nodes in Uu (or U ′), by Item 2, will be in
PTp with value ⊥ and will color their subtrees in RTp to ⊥. Therefore, if p applies any rule to put the value of σxvu,
it will be to ⊥. This contradicts the fact that u ∈ Vd.
—- Consider the case that q used RESOLVE RULE to put σxv to ⊥: If q applies RESOLVE RULE, then it should
have a set Ue of RT-confirmed on (σx, v,⊥) in PTq . Each u in Ue has a set Wu of size t + 1 such that for each
u′ ∈ Wu PTq(σxvuu
′) = ⊥. Since, at least one of the nodes in Ue is in Vd, there is a contradiction to the induction
on Statement 3b.
— Consider the case that q used RELAXED RULE to put σxv to ⊥: Contradiction, to Statement 3d.
Thus, we are left with the option of q applying SPECIAL-BOT RULE put σxv to ⊥, proving the statement.
Proof of Statement 3b of Item 3 for Claim 2. In this case, potentially some nodes from Vp (though at most one) may
resolve to ⊥. Observe that node σx in RTq has at most n− ℓ− (n− t) = t− ℓ children nodes outside Vp. Since ℓ ≥ 1,
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for the claim not to hold there should be at least 2 nodes form Vp that resolve to ⊥. Statement 3a and the definition
of SPECIAL-BOT RULE imply that at most one node can be resolved using SPECIAL-BOT RULE. We are done since
t− ℓ+ 1 < t+ 1.
Proof of Statement 3c of Item 3 for Claim 2. The observation above implies that every node in Vp that is put in RTq
should be with value ⊥. Thus, proving this case.
➤ Consider the case that p used IT-TO-RT RULE to put σx:
Statement 3a is not applicable in this case, and the rest of the cases we discuss next.
Proof of Statement 3b of Item 3 for Claim 2. The IT-TO-RT RULE implies that in ITp there is a set V of n− t voters
of (σ, x, d), where d 6= ⊥. Each v ∈ V has a set Wv of n− t processes that are confirmed on (σ, x, d), where v is a
supporter to each u ∈ Wv on (σ, x, d). Each such u, being confirmed on (σ, x, d), has a set Uu of n− t supporters in
ITp to u on (σ, x, d). Each of these sets of size n− t contains at least t+1 correct nodes. Let U⊥ be the set of children
nodes, where each one has at most t correct supporters to (σ, x, d) in ITp. The above implies that |U⊥| ≤ t− ℓ (notice
that U⊥ ⊆ N \Wv).
Assume by contradiction that q has |Vq| > t children nodes of σx in PTq such that PTq(σxu) = ⊥ for each
u ∈ Vq . Therefore, there must exist two nodes, y1, y2 ∈ Vq that are not from the set U⊥ (because ℓ ≥ 1 so |U⊥| ≤
t− ℓ ≤ t− 1).
We now go through the put rules q can apply to put values to the children nodes of σx. We will also study the
minimal round at which q can apply these put rules. Since RTq(σx) can’t have a value when the put rule is applied
by q to the children nodes of σx, the earliest round at which q can use any other rule to put it’s value, if at all, is the
end of ℓ+ 2 .
For round ℓ + 2 : If ℓ + 2 ≤ k, then by the end of round ℓ + 2, it can’t be that all echoing processes to y1 or y2
have sent the value ⊥. Thus, by the end of round ℓ + 2, q cannot have either y1 or y2 in RTq with value ⊥, and the
claim holds.
For round ℓ + 3 : If ℓ + 3 ≤ k, then by the end of round ℓ + 3, each y ∈ {y1, y2} has t + 1 correct children that
are supporters for d in ITq and therefore y can’t be in PTq(σxy) for value ⊥. Thus, by the end of round ℓ+ 3, q can
have at most t− ℓ children nodes of σx in RTq with value ⊥, and the claim holds.
If ℓ+4 ≤ k, then by the end of round ℓ+4, by Item 2, the value of all correct nodes in all sets V , Wv and Uu above
are already inRTq . This implies that y1 and y2 each has at least t+1 children nodes inRTq with value d. The value of
neither y1 nor y2 can be put to ⊥ using rules RESOLVE RULE, or RELAXED RULE, and clearly not SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT
RULE. We already excluded EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE, and IT-TO-RT RULE, so the only rule
that may be applied is SPECIAL-BOT RULE. But SPECIAL-BOT RULE can be applied only when all other sibling nodes
are already in RTq, so it can be applied to either y1 or y2 but not to both. A contradiction. This completes the proof
of Statement 3b for this case, assuming p used IT-TO-RT RULE to put the value of RTp(σx).
Proof of Statement 3c of Item 3 for Claim 2. The proof is identical to the proof of Statement 3b with a small change,
except that SPECIAL-BOT RULE does not produce a value that is different than ⊥.
➤ Consider the case that p used EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE in order to put σx.
Proof of Statement 3b of Item 3 for Claim 2. The EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE implies that in ITp there is a set U , U∩{u′ |
u′ ∈ σx} = ∅, |U | = n − ℓ, such that for every u, v ∈ U \ F , IT(σxu) = IT(σxv). Assume first that no correct
process closes the branch by the end of round ℓ+ 1. This implies that q will also see all correct processes sending the
same value. Therefore, it can’t apply any rule on it’s ITq to put any child of σx PTq with a value of ⊥. By the end of
round ℓ + 3, by Item 2, the value of all correct nodes in U are already in RTq. This implies that q can’t have a set Vq
of more than size t for any different value.
Now, if there is u ∈ U that closed the branch and did not send in round ℓ + 1, then by the end of round ℓ + 1,
by Statement 2c, at every correct process q, ∃σ′ ❁ σx such that σ′ ∈ RTq, which implies that by the end of ℓ + 1,
σx ∈ RTq , contradicting our assumption.
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Proof of Statement 3c of Item 3 for Claim 2. The proof is identical to the proof of Statement 3b with a small change,
except that SPECIAL-BOT RULE does not produce a value that is different than ⊥.
➤ Consider the case that p used STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE in order to put σx.
Proof of Statement 3b of Item 3 for Claim 2. Assume for contradiction that ∃Vq such that |Vq| = t + 1, where Vq =
{u | PTq(σxu) = ⊥}. The STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE implies that in ITp, by the end of round ℓ + 2, there is a set U ,
U∩{u′ | u′ ∈ σ} = ∅, |U | = n−ℓ+1 such that for every u, v ∈ U \F , where v 6= u, ITp(σxuv) = ITp(σxvu) = d.
Assume first that no correct process closes the branch by the end of round ℓ+2. This implies that ITq will include
all values above appearing in ITp for correct processes. We assume that there is no correct process in σx, and that
|σx| ≥ 1. Therefore |Fq \ {u′ | u′ ∈ σx}| < t. Moreover, also |(Fp ∪ Fq) \ {u′ | u′ ∈ σx}| < t. Therefore, there
should be at least two processes in Vq that are not inFq. Therefore, there should be y ∈ Vq such that y ∈ U \(Fp∪Fq).
By the definition ofU , there is a set Uq of n−t−1 correct processes such that ITq(σxyu) = d, for u ∈ Uq . Therefore,
by the end of round ℓ+ 3 q can’t have PTq(σxy) = ⊥.
Since p applied STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of round ℓ+2, by the end of ℓ+3, by Statement 2c, σx ∈ RTq,
so PTq(σxy) will never be set to ⊥. A contradiction.
Proof of Statement 3c of Item 3 for Claim 2. The proof is identical to the proof of Statement 3b with a small change,
except that SPECIAL-BOT RULE does not produce a value that is different than ⊥.
➤ Consider the case that p used RELAXED RULE to put σx: In this case when p applies the rule, all its children
nodes are in PTp. By induction (Statement 3d), none of these children nodes will appear with a conflicting value in
PTq. Since n−t−1 of them are with the same value d′, then at most n−ℓ−(n−t−1) = t−ℓ+1 are with a different
value. RELAXED RULE is applied only when ℓ ≥ 1. This immediately implies that Statement 3b and Statement 3c
hold.
We completed the proof of the first 3 statements. We now prove the last one.
Proof of Statement 3d of Item 3 for Claim 2. If |σx| ≥ 1, then Statement 3b and Statement 3c clearly prove that State-
ment 3d holds, unless p uses SPECIAL-BOT RULE to put σx. The proof above covers the case that q uses any rule other
than SPECIAL-BOT RULE, by symmetry between p and q in this statement. Thus, we are left with the case that both
are using SPECIAL-BOT RULE, and clearly both put ⊥.
We are left to consider the case |σx| = 0, thus σx = ǫ¯. For that we need to consider all put rules that p and q may
have applied. There are 3 applicable rules, IT-TO-RT RULE, RESOLVE RULE, and SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE, to put
a value to ǫ¯. Notice that SPECIAL-BOT RULE and RELAXED RULE are not applicable and EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or
STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE were covered in Statement 2c.
Node ǫ¯ has n children nodes, out of which at least n− t are correct and out of the t others, at most φ are actively
faulty and at lease t − φ are silent. Notice that for ǫ¯, every child node that is in RTp is also in PTp, since once we
assign a value to ǫ¯ we do not process any other node.
➤ Consider the case that p used EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE to put a value to ǫ¯: Both rules
imply that p sees a unanimous echoing by all n processes, with the exception of at most one process. Since we assume
that all correct processes participate, there is no way that q will put a different value to ǫ¯.
➤ Consider the case that p used IT-TO-RT RULE to put ǫ¯ and that RTp(ǫ¯) = ⊥: The basic arguments are the same
as in the case ℓ ≥ 1, but the set of put rules that q may apply differ. If q also uses IT-TO-RT RULE, then the claim
clearly holds. If q uses SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE, then it obtains the same value. So we are left with the case of q
using RESOLVE RULE. The arguments are the same as in the case ℓ ≥ 1, which exclude the possibility that q puts any
value other than ⊥ to ǫ¯, completing the proof of this case.
➤ Consider the case that p used IT-TO-RT RULE to put ǫ¯ and that RTp(ǫ¯) = d, d 6= ⊥: We now need to consider
the possibility of q using IT-TO-RT RULE, RESOLVE RULE and SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE. The arguments for the first
two are the same as above and are left out.
For using SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE node q should have a set Vq , |Vq | = t + 1, such that for each v ∈ Vq,
RTq(v) = ⊥. Notice that also here there is no difference between RTq(v) and PTq(v).
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The IT-TO-RT RULE implies that in ITp there is a set Vp of n− t voters of (ǫ¯, ǫ, d). Each v ∈ Vp has a set of Wv
of n − t children nodes such that v is a supporter to each u ∈ Wv on (ǫ¯, ǫ, d), and each such u has a set Uu of n − t
supporters in ITp to (ǫ¯, ǫ, d). Each of these sets of size n− t contains at least t+ 1 correct nodes. Thus, there is a set
U⊥ of size at most t that does not have at least t+ 1 correct supporters to (ǫ¯, ǫ, d).
Thus, there should be a process x ∈ Vq that has a set Ux of n− t supporters in ITp to (ǫ¯, ǫ, d). The set contains a
set U¯x of at least t + 1 correct processes that are also supporters in ITq to (ǫ¯, ǫ, d). Consider the various rules q can
apply to put a value ⊥ to RTq(x). By the end of the 2nd round it can apply EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE to set a ⊥ to it,
because all processes in U¯x send a different value. For that reason it can’t apply IT-TO-RT RULE in the end of round
3 to put value ⊥ to RTq(x). By the end of round 4 for every process y ∈ U¯x PTq(xy) = d. Process q can’t apply
SPECIAL-BOT RULE to put a value ⊥ to x, since that rule is not applicable for |x| = 1. RESOLVE RULE, RELAXED
RULE or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE, can’t be used to put ⊥. Since we assume that k < φ, the case φ = 1 is not relevant,
Therefore also ROUND φ+ 1 RULE can’t be applied either - and we are done.
➤ Consider the case that p used RESOLVE RULE to put ǫ¯: If q uses IT-TO-RT RULE, by symmetry we are done. If
q also uses RESOLVE RULE, by definition both obtain the same value. We are left with the case that q uses SPECIAL-
ROOT-BOT RULE. The interesting case is that RTp(ǫ¯) = d, d 6= ⊥. Observe that we cannot use the induction on k = 1
since the set of applicable rules differ. The arguments for proving the case are similar to the previous case, the case of
IT-TO-RT RULE, since q can’t apply SPECIAL-BOT RULE to any node in level 1.
➤ Consider the case that p used SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE to put ǫ¯: If q also uses it the claim holds. Otherwise it
falls into the other rules discussed above.
This completes the proof of Statement 3d .
This completes the proof of Item 3 (Safety) for Claim 2.
Proof of Item 4 for Claim 2 . (Liveness) It is enough to prove that if p ∈ G puts σx ∈ PTp in some round r ≤ k, then
by the end of round max(r + 2, φ+ 1) σx ∈ RTq , for every q ∈ G.
We prove the lemma by backward induction on ℓ = |σx|, from ℓ = k to ℓ = 1. As in the proof of Item 3, the claim
clearly holds for ℓ = k, since no node of level k, k < φ + 1 can be added to PT by the end of round k. The case
ℓ = k − 1 is applicable only to EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, and is covered by the proof of Statement 2c.
Assume the induction for any k ≥ ℓ′ > ℓ and we will prove for ℓ, ℓ ≤ φ− 1. If σx contains a correct node then by
induction on Item 2 we are done. So assume that there is no correct process in σx. Let p be the first to put σx, where
σx ∈ PTp, and let r be the round at which it did that. Consider the various possible put rules.
➤ Case p applied EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE Statement 2c implies the proof.
➤ Case p applied IT-TO-RT RULE: By definition, this can happen only in round r = ℓ + 2. The IT-TO-RT RULE
implies that there are t+ 1 correct voters of (σ, x, d) in ITp, each having n− t nodes, each of which is confirmed on
(σ, x, d) in ITp. Let Ux be the set of the confirmed nodes on (σ, x, d) in ITp and Ve the set of correct voters. Observe
that Ux contains at least t+ 1 correct processes.
If by round r + 1 σx ∈ RTq we are done. If not, then if for any u ∈ Ux σxu ∈ RTq, it should be in PTq , and it
should be with a value d, because of using either IT-TO-RT RULE, EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE
by q, and it can’t obtain a different value, because of the correct processes in Ux and Ve.
If by round r+ 2 σx ∈ RTq we are done. If not, Item 2 implies that by max(r + 2, k) all voters in Ve will appear
in RTq as RT-voters on (σ, x, d), since the nodes in Ux will be confirmed to (σ, x, d). These arguments and Item 3
imply that if any of them is colored, it should be colored to d. Therefore, q can apply RESOLVE RULE to add σx to
PTq and we are done.
➤ Case p applied RESOLVE RULE: By definition, assuming that no branch closing took place, this can happen
only in some round r ≥ ℓ + 4. Assume first that ℓ ≥ 1, we later deal with smaller values of ℓ. If by the end of round
r + 2 process q puts a value to σx or to a predecessor of σx, we are done. Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis,
by r + 2, each node involved in applying RESOLVE RULE by p to σx in PTp is either colored or its value put by q in
RTq. We will show that by r + 2 process q can apply one of the rules to put a value to σx in PTq.
Let Vp be that set of children nodes of σx that are RT-confirmed to d′ in RTp. By Statement 3d, for every v ∈ Vp,
if σxv ∈ PTp and σxv ∈ PTq , then PTp(σxv) = PTq(σxv).
17
None of the nodes in Vp can be confirmed to a different value than d′ in RTq , unless it was put by q to a different
value. If d′ 6= ⊥ this can happen to the value of ⊥ and by Statement 3a, this can happen only using SPECIAL-BOT
RULE. Thus, there can be at most one such node z ∈ Vp that was set to ⊥ by q.
If none was set using SPECIAL-BOT RULE, then by r + 2 process q should see the same set of voters that p did
and is able to apply RESOLVE RULE. Otherwise, it should have applied the SPECIAL-BOT RULE to one of the nodes in
Vp. Before it can apply SPECIAL-BOT RULE, all other children nodes of σx should be put to a value. After applying
SPECIAL-BOT RULE to node σxz all the children nodes of σx have a value in RTq. For every y ∈ Vp the value is d′,
so q, by that time, would have at least n − t − 1 children nodes set to d′. Thus, q can apply RELAXED RULE to put a
value to σx and the claim holds.
In the case of ℓ = 1, by definition q can’t apply SPECIAL-BOT RULE to set a value to z. And therefore it should
have been able to use RESOLVE RULE to set a value to σx. The case of ℓ = 0 is similar to the case of ℓ = 1.
➤ Case p applied RELAXED RULE: since p applies this rule, all the children nodes of σx are put to a value in PTp
and by induction by r + 2 also at q. If σx ∈ RTq , we are done. Otherwise, by Statement 3d their value is the same as
for p and process q can also apply RELAXED RULE.
➤ Case p applied SPECIAL-BOT RULE or SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE: exactly as in the previous case.
This completes the proof of Item 4 (Liveness) for Claim 2.
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
We can now complete the proof of the Theorem by covering the case of k ∈ {φ, φ+ 1}
Proof of Claim 3. We cover both cases for each item.
Proof of Item 1 for Claim 3. (Detection) There is no special issues that surface in the last two round regarding detec-
tion, and the proof for the case k < φ holds.
Proof of Item 2 for Claim 3. (Liveness)
➤ Consider the case k = φ: There is no difference between the arguments for this case and those of k < φ.
➤ Consider the case k = φ + 1: If |σx| = φ and if any correct process is not sending in this round it is because
of applying the RT [r − 3] limitation, and by induction we are done. Otherwise, if z sends, then ROUND φ + 1 RULE
completes the proof. The case |σx| < φ is identical to that of k < φ.
The proof of Statement 2b is similar to the case in which a correct process sends⊥ in the first round (Statement 2a).
Proof of Item 3 for Claim 3. (Safety) Item 3 is not applicable in case k = φ+ 1.
Consider the case k = φ. The case |σx| = φ: A value to a node at this level can’t be put at any round≤ φ. Observe
that two correct processes may put conflicting values in their RT to a node σxy at level φ+1 that is associated with a
faulty process, since they may have conflicting values in their IT for that node. This may happen only if there wasn’t
any correct predecessor of x in σ, since Item 2 implies that before assigning y a value it would already be colored. By
Property 1, there is no conflict on all the t − φ faulty nodes that are initially in FA. Thus, there can be at most one
faulty node in level φ+ 1. Item 2 also implies that during round φ+ 1 node σx will be assigned a value by all correct
processes, and therefore so will node σxy.
Statement 3a is not applicable in the case of |σx| = φ.
Proof of Statement 3c for Claim 3. Node σx was put to ⊥ by process p. By the assumption of Statement 3c, SPECIAL-
BOT RULE wasn’t applied. ROUND φ+1 RULE is not applicable, since we are in level φ. IT-TO-RT RULE and RESOLVE
RULE are not relevant, since there is only a single level of nodes in IT or RT . SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE is relevant
only for the case of σx = ǫ¯, which can’t happen for |σx| = φ. If process p uses EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-
TO-RT RULE, then similar arguments to those used in the proof of Statement 2c can be used.
We are left with RELAXED RULE. Node σx has n − t − 1 children nodes in RTp all having the value ⊥ and all
but one are clearly correct nodes. Since there are exactly n − φ − 1 nodes in level φ + 1, and there can be at most
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n− φ − 1 − (n − t − 2) = t − φ + 1 nodes holding a non ⊥ value. Thus, node q can’t have t+ 1 or more children
nodes with a value not ⊥ when it applies it’s put operation; Completing the arguments for Statement 3c.
Proof of Statement 3b for Claim 3. Node σx was put to d, d 6= ⊥ by process p. Thus, SPECIAL-BOT RULE is not
applicable and, as in Statement 3c, we are left with RELAXED RULE. Node σx has n − t − 1 children nodes in RTq
all having the value d and all but one are clearly correct nodes. Since there are exactly n− φ− 1 nodes in level φ+1,
and there can be at most n − φ − 1 − (n − t − 2) = t − φ + 1 nodes holding a non d value. Thus, node q can’t
have t + 1 or more children nodes with a value not d when it applies it’s put operation; completing the arguments for
Statement 3b.
Proof of Statement 3d for Claim 3. Case d = ⊥, if σx ∈ PTq , then by Statement 3c, the only applicable rules for q
are RELAXED RULE, or SPECIAL-BOT RULE. Both will result in validating the claim. Case d = 6⊥, if σx ∈ PTq , then
by Statement 3b it is clear that the only possible rule to be applied is RELAXED RULE, which results in validating the
claim for Statement 3d.
For node |σx| < φ − 1 identical arguments to those used in the proof of Claim 2 complete the proof of Item 3
(Safety) for Claim 3.
Proof of Item 4 for Claim 3 . (Liveness) The arguments for this item are the same for k = φ and k = φ + 1. As
we mentioned before, it is enough to prove that if p ∈ G puts σx ∈ PTp in some round r, then by the end of
max(r + 2, φ+ 1) σx ∈ RTq , for every q ∈ G. The proof is by backward induction on ℓ = |σx|.
Case ℓ = φ + 1. The only round at which a process can put a value to a node in level φ + 1 in it’s RT is during
round φ+ 1. At that round, every correct process that doesn’t have σx in its RT as a colored node, will insert it to its
RT using ROUND φ+ 1 RULE.
Case ℓ = φ. Either p used EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE or it set the value in round φ + 1.
If it used EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE, or STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE, then Statement 2c completes the proof. Now we need
to consider the various potential put rules p applied in round φ + 1 in order to put the value for σx. IT-TO-RT RULE
and RESOLVE RULE are not applicable in this case.
➤ Case p applied RELAXED RULE: If exists a correct process in σ then by Item 2 we are done. If x 6∈ G then all
children nodes of σx are either correct or silent, and if p applies the rule, every correct process can apply the same
rule. If x ∈ G, then there are n − t − 1 correct children nodes of σx, all of which will send the same value, and all
will apply the RELAXED RULE, completing the proof of this case.
➤ Case p applied SPECIAL-BOT RULE: using similar arguments as above, this case is applicable only if x 6∈ G,
and as the arguments above show, if any correct process applies this rule, all will.
For node |σ| < φ−1 identical arguments to those used in the proof of Claim 2 complete the proof of this case.
This completes the proof of Claim 3.
We now prove the theorem for the case of φ = 1.
By assumption there is at most one faulty process, say b, that doesn’t appear in FA of any correct process. There
are at most two rounds of information exchange.
In the first round every process sends its input value. By the end of the first round, at every z, ITz(ǫ¯) = dz .
ITz(z) = dz , and for every x ∈ N \ Fz , ITz = dx, where dx is the value received from x, and for every y ∈ Fz ,
ITz = ⊥. The only rule that may be applied by a correct process by the end of this round is the EARLY IT-TO-RT
RULE.
Assume that z applies the EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of round 1. This can happen only when all inputs
are ⊥ or when Fz = ∅ and all input values are identical. If this happen, z sets RTz(ǫ¯) = ITz(ǫ¯) = dz . z does not
send any message in round 2. Following that, every correct process p that doesn’t stop sends to every process the set
of values it entered to ITp(x) for every x ∈ N. If a correct process z stops, all these values are identical, other than
the values associated with b. Moreover, for z and any other correct process that did not send a message, all correct
processes add to their IT the same value for it. By the end of round 2, every correct process, p, that did not stop
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applies ROUND φ + 1 RULE to copy ITp(σ), for σ ∈ Σ2 to RTp(σ). By the previous discussion it is clear that all
will have identical values regarding all node, other than maybe the nodes on σ that include b. Therefore, every correct
process p will be able to apply RELAXED RULE and will put the same value to ǫ¯.
This discussion shows, implicitly that all the items of the theorem hold for this case.
Now consider the case that no correct z stopped at the end of round 1. In the second round every correct process
sends to every process the set of values it entered to ITp(x) for every x ∈ N. By the end of round 2 every correct
process, p, applies ROUND φ + 1 RULE to copy ITp(σ), for σ ∈ Σ2 to RTp(σ). By the end of the second round, for
every p, q, z correct processes RTp(zp) = RTp(zq) = RTq(zp).
Since b is the only potentially faulty process we conclude that for every p, q, z ∈ N \ {b}, RTp(bz) = RTq(bz).
We now show that the theorem holds in this case.
To prove that Item 2 (Validity) holds, let’s look at its three statements. Statement 2c vacuously holds. Statement 2a
holds, since for every correct process that sends in the last round there is consensus. For every p in G that sends in
the first round, as we mentioned before, all processes, but b, sent the same value dp that p sent in the first round, and
by applying RELAXED RULE, which can be applied to node p, all reach consensus. For every p ∈ FA, the same
arguments hold.
To prove that Item 3 holds, let’s look at its four statements.
Proof of Statement 3a when φ = 1. By definition, node p, p ∈ G, can apply RESOLVE RULE only on node ǫ¯. Assume
it resolved to d, d 6= ⊥.By definition p observed at least 2 processes as voters to d, and it identified n−tRT-confirmed
nodes. All correct processes among them will never resolve to ⊥. The only possibility that another correct process q
can resolve any to ⊥ is node b. If node b is RT-confirmed, it has at least 2 children nodes x, y such that RTp(bx) =
RTp(by) = ⊥. Since both x and y are necessarily correct processes, we conclude that RTq(bx) = RTq(by) = ⊥.
Moreover, for all RT-confirmed nodes z in RTp, except of node b, RTp(z) = RTq(z) = d, since all are correct. The
only rule q may be able to apply to resolve b to ⊥ is SPECIAL-BOT RULE. But SPECIAL-BOT RULE is not applicable
to nodes of level 1.
Proof of Statement 3b and Statement 3c when φ = 1. These statements clearly hold since PTp is defined only for
nodes in level 1, and PTq is not defined for level φ+ 1.
Proof of Statement 3d when φ = 1. Consider three cases, if x ∈ G, then by Item 2 we conclude equality. Consider
the case that x = b. In this case, as we wrote above, for every p, q, z ∈ N \ {b}, RTp(bz) = RTq(bz). Therefore, if p
applied a rule to conclude b ∈ PTp, so will q. We are left with the case of x = ǫ¯. As we just proved, on every node of
level 1, p and q agrees. All but one of them are nodes associated with correct processes. The only node on level 2 on
which p and q differ is node xb. But because of coloring, both color node xb by the value of x. Therefore, on every
node σ, |σ| ≥ 1 if σ ∈ RTp, then σ ∈ RTq . Therefore, every rule p applies holds also for q. This completes the proof
of Statement 3d.
To prove that Item 4 holds consider the 3 possible levels. ROUND φ+ 1 RULE implies that it holds for level φ+ 1.
Statement 3d proves the rest of the cases.
To prove that Item 1 holds observe that by Property 1, it holds initially. In the first round, no detection takes place.
In the 2nd round, no correct process suspects any other correct process.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
The following Theorem summarizes the properties needed from our protocol.
Theorem 3. For a (t, φ)-adversary and protocolDφ and n ≥ 3t+1 and assuming that all correct processes participate
in the protocol:
1. Every correct process outputs the same value.
2. If the input values of all correct processes are the same, this is the output value. Every correct process outputs
it by round 2 and stops by round 3.
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3. If t+1 of the correct processes hold an input value of ⊥, then all correct processes output⊥ by the end of round
3 and stop by the end of round 4.
4. If the actual number of faults is fφ < φ, then all correct processes complete the protocol by the end of round
fφ + 2.
5. If the actual number of faults is fφ = 0, and all correct processes start with the same initial value, then all
correct processes complete the protocol by the end of round 1.
6. If the actual number of faults is fφ = 1, and all correct processes start with the same initial value, then all
correct processes complete the protocol by the end of round 2.
7. If a correct process outputs in round k, it stops by the end of round k + 1.
8. If a correct process stops in the end of round k, all correct processes output by round k + 1 and stop by round
k + 2.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Statement 1: By definition a correct process outputs a value once it identifies a frontier. It is clear that by
the end of round φ+ 1 there is a frontier for every correct process. Define the front of RT to be: σx is in the front of
RT if exists p ∈ G such that σx ∈ RTp and for every q ∈ G, σ 6∈ RTq. Theorem 2 implies that if σ is in the front of
process p, within two rounds it will be in the front of any other correct process. Since all correct processes shares the
front, then if ǫ¯ ∈ RTp, it will be at every other correct process and vice versa. Since a process does not stop for two
rounds after it holds a frontier the first claim holds.
Proof of Statement 2: Lemma 1 proves the second claim.
Proof of Statement 3: The proof of Theorem 2 implies that SPECIAL-ROOT-BOT RULE can be applied by the end of
round 3 if there are t+ 1 correct processes that start with input ⊥. Thus, the third claim holds.
Proof of Statement 4: Observe that if the actual number of faults is fφ and fφ < φ, then for every σ ∈ Σφ+1 there is a
prefix of length k, k ≤ fφ+1 in which a correct process appears as the last node. If k ≤ φ− 1 then by Theorem 2, by
k + 2 every correct process will have that prefix in its RT and will be able to apply DECAY RULE to close the branch
by the end of round φ+ 2.
Consider a prefix τp of length φ+1. By assumption τ contains all faulty processes. Therefore, by the end of round
φ + 2, every correct process will be able to apply EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE to add τp to RT and will close the branch.
Observe that sometimes more than one rule can be applied, but since we go down from the later rounds to the earlier
ones, we happen to close the branch earlier.
We are left with the case of τp of length φ. There is at most one corrupt node, say x, that can send values relating
to τp that will be added to the IT of correct processes in rounds φ + 1 and round φ + 2. In round φ + 1 all correct
processes becomes children nodes and by the end of round φ + 2 all will add τp to their PT and would be able to
apply STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE to close the branch.
Thus, in all cases, by the end of round φ+ 2 all correct processes will close all branches and can output a value.
Proof of Statement 5: since there are no faults, all correct processes apply EARLY IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of the
first round to set a value to ǫ¯.
Proof of Statement 6: since there is a single fault, all correct processes apply STRONG IT-TO-RT RULE by the end of
the 2nd round to set a value to ǫ¯.
Proof of Statement 7: The branch closing rules immediately imply that there can be at most one round between
adding the final value to RT that produces the frontier, thus providing output, and closing of all branches that imply
stopping the protocol.
Proof of Statement 8: The first part of the statement holds, since if p stops by the end of round k, it doesn’t send
anything in round k + 1. Theorem 2 (Statement 2c) imply that by the end of that round every correct process will
output a value, and by the previous statement all will stop by the end of k + 2.
4 Monitors
We follow the approach of [BG93, GM93, GM98] with some modifications for guaranteeing early stopping.
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In round r = 1 we run Dt using the initial values. For each integer k, in round 1 < r = 1+ 4k < t− 1 we invoke
protocolDt−1−4k whose initial values is either ⊥ (meaning everything is OK) or BAD (meaning that too many corrupt
processes were detected). We call this sequence of protocols the basic monitor sequence. We will actually run 4 such
sequences.
4.1 The Basic Monitor Protocol
Each process z stores two variables: v ∈ D, the current value, and early, a boolean value. Initially v equals the initial
input of process z and early := false . Later, early = true will be an indicator that the next decision protocol must
decide ⊥ (because there is not enough support for BAD). Each process remembers the last value of earlyq it received
from every other process q, even if q did not send one recently.
Throughout this section we use the notation: r¯ ≡ r (mod 4).
Algorithm 1: The Basic Monitor protocol (at process z)
1: if r¯ = 1:
2: if r < t − 1 then invoke protocol Dt+1−r with initial value vz ;
3: if r¯ = 2:
4: at the end of the round:
5: if |FA| ≥ r + 3 then set vz := BAD
6: otherwise set vz := ⊥;
7: if r¯ = 3:
8: send vz to all;
9: at the end of the round:
10: if |{q | vq = BAD}| ≤ t then set earlyz := true
11: otherwise set earlyz := false ;
12: if r¯ = 0:
13: send earlyz to all;
14: at the end of the round:
15: if |{q | earlyq = true}| ≥ t+ 1 then set vz := ⊥;
16: if every previously invoked protocol produced an output then set vz := ⊥.
The monitor protocol runs in the background until the process halts. The monitor protocol invokes a new Dφ
protocol every 4 rounds. In each round, the monitor’s lines of code are executed before running all the other protocols,
and its end of round lines of code are executed before ending the current round in all currently running protocols.
This is important, since it needs to detect, for example, whether all currently running protocols produced outputs for
determining its variable for the next round. At the end of each round the monitor protocol applies the monitor halting
and monitor decision rules below to determine whether to halt all the running protocols at once, or only to commit to
the final decision value.
When a process is instructed to apply a monitor decision it applies the following definition. If it is instructed to
halt (monitor halting), then if it did not previously apply the monitor decision, it applies monitor decision first and then
halts all currently running protocols that were invoked by the monitor at once.
Definition 1 (monitor decision). A process that did not previously decide, decides BAD, if any previously invoked
protocol outputs BAD. Otherwise, it decides on the output of Dt.
When a process is instructed to decide without halting, it may need to continue running all protocols for few more
rounds to help others to decide. We define “halt by r+ x” to mean continue to run all active protocols until the end of
round min{r + x, t+ 1}, unless an halt is issued earlier.
4.2 Monitor Halting and Decision Conditions
Given that different processes may end various invocations of the protocols in different rounds we need a rule to make
sure that all running protocols end by the end of round f + 2. The challenge in stopping all protocols by the end
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of f + 2 is the fact that individual protocols may end at round f + 2 and we do not have a room to exchange extra
messages among the processes. This also implies that we need to have a halting rule at every round of the monitor
protocol, since f + 2 may occur at any round.
Each halting rule implies how other rules need to be enforced in later rounds, since any process may be the first to
apply a monitor halting at a given round and we need to ensure that for every extension of the protocols, until everyone
decides, all will reach the same decision despite the fact that those that have halted are not participating any more. The
conditions take into account processes that may have halted. A process considers another one as halted if it doesn’t
receive any message from it in any of the concurrently running set of invoked protocols, monitors and the gossiping of
F .
To achieve that we add the following set of rules.
Monitor Halting Rules:
HBAD. Apply monitor halting if any monitor stops with output BAD. Otherwise if any monitor outputs BAD, apply
monitor decision now and monitor halting by r + 2.
H1. Case r¯ = 1:
(a) If all previously invoked protocols stopped, apply monitor halting.
(b) Otherwise, if only the latest invoked protocol did not stop and |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n− t,
then apply monitor halting.
(c) Otherwise, if only the latest invoked protocol did not stop and |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ t + 1,
then apply monitor decision now and monitor halting by r + 2.
H2. Case r¯ = 2:
(a) If all previously invoked protocols stopped, apply monitor halting.
(b) Otherwise, if only the latest invoked protocol did not stop and |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n − t
was true in the previous round, then apply monitor halting.
(c) Otherwise, if only the latest invoked protocol did not stop and |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ t + 1
was true in the previous round, then apply monitor decision and now and monitor halting by r + 1.
H3. Case r¯ = 3: If all previously invoked protocols stopped, apply monitor halting.
H4. Case r¯ = 0: If all previously invoked protocols stopped and |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n − t then
apply monitor halting.
Lemma 3. If n > 3t and there are f , f ≤ t, corrupt processes then all correct processes apply monitor halting by the
end of round min(t+ 1, f + 2).
Proof. We need to show that all previously invoked protocols halt by the end of round min(t+1, f +2). Observe that
Theorem 3 (Statement 4), implies that Dt itself is stopped by min(t+ 1, f + 2).
By definition, protocol Dφ is invoked in round rφ, where φ = t + 1 − rφ. By Theorem 3 (Statement 4), Dφ is
stopped by min(φ + 1, tφ + 2), if the upper bound on the number of faults (that were not detected by all correct
processes before invoking the protocol) is tφ. Note that if the number of faults that are not detected by all is higher
than tφ the protocol may not stop by φ+ 1.
Let’s study the number of faults that are not detected by all correct processes when Dφ is invoked. Figure 1 Line 3
indicates that if any correct p set vp := BAD in round rφ − 3, then, by Lemma 2, the number of faults that are not
detected by all correct processes when Dφ is invoked is at most t − rφ. In such a case, by Theorem 3, Dφ will be
stopped by round min(φ+ 1, tφ + 2), where tφ ≤ t− rφ. Let us call these Dφ regular-protocols.
If no correct p sets vp := BAD, then all correct processes invoke Dφ with v = ⊥, therefore no matter how many
faults are present (as long as not more than t), Lemma 1 guarantees that Dφ is stopped within 3 rounds, and all outputs
are obtained within 2 rounds. Let us call these Dφ fast protocols.
For regular-protocols we need to prove that the extra conditions hold. In addition, for fast-protocols we need also
to prove that the protocol that was invoked recently will also stop in time.
Let us consider the r (mod 4) round at which min(t+ 1, f + 2) falls.
Case min(t + 1, f + 2) (mod 4) = 0: By H4 we need to show that all previously invoked protocols will be stopped
and that |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n− t, at every correct process.
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For regular-protocols, since all are stopped by round min(t + 1, f + 2) then when correct processes executed
Line 3, just before stopping, none would set v := BAD. Therefore, all will set v to ⊥ and later early to true. Thus,
the extra property for H4 holds, and all will halt.
For fast-protocols, since no process sets v to BAD, every previously invoked protocol stops within at most 3 rounds
(Theorem 3, Statement 2). The latest protocol was invoked 3 rounds ago, and we are done. The arguments for the
extra condition in H4 are the same as for the regular-protocols.
Case min(t+ 1, f + 2) (mod 4) = 3: By H3 we need to show that all previously invoked protocols will be stopped.
The arguments for regular-protocols and for fast protocols are the same, the latest invocation was two rounds ago,
and therefore, by Theorem 3 (Statement 2), by the end of the current round all will be stopped.
Case min(t + 1, f + 2) (mod 4) = 2: By H2 we need to show that either all previously invoked protocols have
stopped by the end of the current round, or all but the last one and the extra condition holds.
If min(t + 1, f + 2) = t + 1, then no protocol was invoked in the previous round, by definition. All previous
regular or fast protocols will be stopped by the end of the current round.
If min(t+1, f+2) = f+2, by Theorem 3 (Statement 4), using similar arguments as above, all previous protocols
will be stopped by the end of the current round, except, maybe the last protocol that was invoked in the previous round.
Observe that correct processes set up their v four rounds ago. Since the current round is f +2, then the round at which
the processes executed Line 3 in Figure 1 is f − 2 and therefore no process could have more than f faults, and would
have set v := ⊥. Therefore, every correct process that haven’t halt yet would send early = true two rounds ago, and
therefore the extra condition for H2 holds.
Case min(t + 1, f + 2) (mod 4) = 1: By H1 we need to show that either all previously invoked protocols have
stopped by the end of the current round, or all but the last one and the extra condition holds.
If min(t+1, f +2) = t+1, then no protocol was invoked in the current round, by definition. All previous regular
or fast protocols will be stopped by the end of the current round.
If min(t+1, f+2) = f +2, by Theorem 3 (Statement 4) using similar arguments as above, all previous protocols
will be stopped by the end of the current round, except, maybe the last protocol that was invoked in the previous round.
Observe that correct processes set up their v three rounds ago. Since the current round is f + 2, then the round at
which the processes executed Line 3 in Figure 1 is f − 1 and therefore no process could have more than f faults, and
would have set v := ⊥. Therefore, every correct process that haven’t halt yet would send early = true two rounds
ago, and therefore the extra condition for H1 holds.
Lemma 4. If the first process applies monitor halting in round r on d then every correct process applies moni-
tor decision by round min{r + 4, f + 2, t + 1}, applies monitor halting by round min{r + 5, f + 2, t + 1}, and
obtains the same decision value, d.
Proof. Let p be a correct process applying monitor halting in the earliest round that any correct process applies it.
Observe that in some of the halting rules a process decides before the last invoked protocol outputs a value. There
may be cases that one process halts and other processes continue to run and even invoke an additional protocol after
the halting. We later prove that whenever these cases happen, the decision value is the same and it not BAD. We show
that any protocol whose output is not taken into account by any correct process must output ⊥.
Consider first the case that p halts with output BAD. By Theorem 3 (Statement 1 and Statement 8), if p halts with
output BAD and if the output of that protocol is not ignored by any correct process then all correct processes will output
BAD by next round and will halt within two rounds. This will lead to unanimous decision.
So pending on the fact that we later prove that any protocol whose output is not taken into account by any correct
process will output ⊥, we are left to consider the case that p does not output BAD.
If r = min(t + 1, f + 2), we are done by Lemma 3 (and Theorem 3, Statement 1). Since every correct process
considers the outputs of the same set of protocols, the decision value is the same at every correct process.
Consider the various halting rules used by p to apply monitor halting, and let r be the round at which it was applied.
Case p uses H1: There are three possibilities, one in which p noticed that all previously invoked protocols stopped. In
this case, Theorem 3 (Statement 8) implies that all correct processes will observe that all previously invoked protocols
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reported output by the end of r + 1 and will observe that all previously invoked protocols have stopped by the end of
round r + 2 and will use rule H3 to apply monitor halting. All correct obtain the same decision value, since all will
consider the same set of protocols and, by Theorem 3 (Statement 1) and the decision rule, will decide the same.
Otherwise, when p executed round r it noticed that by the end of that round all previous protocols stopped and
only the one that started at the beginning of round r did not stop yet and the values of early that p received in round
r − 1 imply that |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n − t. Since no process halted earlier, in round r − 1 every
correct process sets v := ⊥. By Lemma 1, the protocol that started in round r will produce output of ⊥ in round r+1
at all correct processes that did not stop earlier, and will stop by round r + 2. Thus, every correct process will apply
either H2 or H3 and will reach the same decision.
Otherwise, when p executed round r− 2 it noticed that by the end of that round all previous protocols stopped and
only the one that started at the beginning of round r − 2 did not stop yet. Moreover, p received at the beginning of
round r − 3, |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ t+ 1. Since no correct halted earlier, the instruction to set the value
for early implies that there was a correct process q that set its earlyq to true in round r − 4. Thus, q received less
than t BAD. This implies that there are t + 1 correct processes with v = ⊥. Lemma 1, implies that the last protocol
starting in the beginning of round r − 2 will output value ⊥ by the end of round r and stop by the end of round r + 1.
By the end of round r all correct processes will observe the outputs of all previously invoked protocols. Therefore,
by the end of round r + 1 all correct processes that did not apply monitor halting already, will either be able to apply
monitor halting by the end of that round, or will set v := ⊥, since all previously invoked protocols produced output
and even stopped. Since the latest invoked protocol is guarantee to produce an output of ⊥, those that have halted will
reach the same decision. Notice that those processes that do not halt will start another protocol in which every correct
process that invoked it has input ⊥ and the rest are not participating. By Corollary 1, by the end of round r + 3 they
will decide the same decision value and will halt by the end of round r + 4.
Case p uses H2: As in the previous case, there are three possibilities, one in which p noticed that all previously
invoked protocols stopped. In this case, Lemma 1 implies that all correct processes will observe that all previously
invoked protocols reported output by the end of r+1 and have stopped by the end of round r+2. Some may use rule
H3 or rule H4 to apply monitor halting and decide the same, and some will invoke the next protocol with input ⊥ and
will reach the same decision by round r + 4 and will halt by the end of round r + 5.
Otherwise, when p executed round r it noticed that by the end of that round all previous protocols stopped and
only the one that started at the beginning of round r − 1 did not stop yet and the values of early that p received in
round r − 2 imply that |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n − t. Since no correct process halted earlier, in round
r − 2 every correct process sets v := ⊥. The protocol that started in round r − 1 will produce output of ⊥ in round r
and stop by round r + 1. Thus, every correct process will reach the same decision and will use rule H3 to halt by the
end of round r + 1.
Otherwise, when p executed round r − 1 it noticed that by the end of that round all previous protocols stopped
and only the one that started at the beginning of round r − 2 did not stop yet. Moreover, p received in round r − 3,
|{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ t + 1. And since no correct process halted earlier, as in the case for halting rule
H1, we are done.
Case p uses H3: Here we need to consider the case were all previously invoked protocols were stopped. In this
case every other correct process that did not apply monitor halting in round r will notice currently running protocols
producing outputs by the end of round r + 1 (Theorem 3, Statement 8) and stopping by the end of round r + 2.
Therefore, by the end of in round r + 1 every correct process that will not halt by the end of round r + 1 will set
v := ⊥. Thus, all correct processes participating in the new protocol in round r + 2 will have an input ⊥, and every
correct process not participating will assume to have an input ⊥. Thus, (Corollary 1) by the end of round r + 3 that
protocol produces an output, and all decides the same decision value and halt by the end of round r + 4.
Case p uses H4: Here we need to consider the case where all previously invoked protocols were stopped, and, in
addition, p observes |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n − t, which leads to halting by the end of round r. In
this case, every other correct process that did not apply monitor halting in round r will notice all previously invoked
protocols producing outputs by the end of round r+1 and stopping by the end of round r+2 (Theorem 3, Statement 8).
The property |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ n− t implies that by the end of round r + 1 or r + 2 every correct
process will notice |{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ t + 1. By the end of round r + 1 all correct processes that
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did not halt in round r, but noticed that all previously invoked protocols stopped by the end of round r + 1 will apply
monitor halting in that round. Those that will notice that all previously invoked protocols, except the one starting in
round r + 1, have stopped, will apply monitor halting. The same arguments as for the case of using rule H3, the
decision value is identical at all correct processes.
By the end of round r + 2, all other correct processes, that did not already apply monitor halting, will either
observe that all previously invoked protocols have stopped and will apply monitor halting, or will observe that all
previously invoked protocols except the one starting in round r + 1 have stopped and will have the condition that
|{q | earlyq = true or q halted}| ≥ t+ 1 and will apply monitor decision by the end of round r + 2 and will halt by
the end of round r + 3, thus potentially ignoring the output of the last protocol. Again, using previous arguments, all
decision values are the same.
Lemma 3 and 4 complete the correctness part of Theorem 1. To simplify the polynomial considerations we look
at a pipeline of monitors.
4.3 Monitors Pipeline
The basic monitor protocol runs a sequence of monitors and tests the number of faults’ threshold every 4 rounds
(Line 5). This allows the adversary to expose more faults in the following round, and be able to further expand the tree
before the threshold is noticed the next time the processes execute Line 5. To circumvent this we will run a pipeline of
3 additional sequences of monitors on top of the basic one appearing above. Doing this we obtain that in every round
r one of the 4 monitor sequences will be testing the threshold on the number of faults
Monitor sequence i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 begins in round i and invokes protocols every 4 rounds, in every round r,
1 < r = i + 4k < t − 1, it invokes protocol Dt−i−4k. Monitor sequence 1 is the basic monitor sequence defined
in the previous subsection. Each monitor sequence independently runs the basic monitor protocol ( Figure 1) every 4
rounds. In the monitor protocol, the test r¯ = j, which stands for r¯ ≡ r (mod 4) in the basic monitor sequence, is
replaced with r¯i = j, which stands for r¯i ≡ r + 1 − i (mod 4) = j (naturally only for r + 1 − i > 0). Each of the
four monitor sequences decides and halts separately, as in the previous section above.
Notice that protocol Dt is invoked only by the basic sequence ( Sequence 1). For each of the three other monitor
sequences, the decision rule is: decide BAD, if any invoked protocol (in this sequence) outputs BAD, and ⊥ otherwise.
Observe that Lemma 3 and 4 hold for each individual sequence.
We now state the global decision and global halting rules:
Definition 2 (Global Halting). If any monitor sequence halts with BAD, or all 4 monitor sequences halt, the process
halts.
Definition 3. The global decision is the output of Dt, unless any monitor sequence returns BAD, in which case the
decision is BAD.
The following are immediate consequences of Lemma 3 and 4 and the above definitions.
Corollary 2. If n > 3t and there are f , f ≤ t, corrupt processes then all correct processes halt by the end of round
min(t+ 1, f + 2).
Corollary 3. If the first correct process halts in round r on d then every correct process applies global decision by
round min{r + 4, f + 2, t+ 1}, halts by round min{r + 5, f + 2, t+ 1}, and obtains the same decision value.
5 Bounding the size of the tree
Following the approach is [GM98], we make the following definitions:
Definition 4. A node σz ∈ Σ is fully corrupt if there does not exist p ∈ G and σ′ ⊒ σz such that σ′ ∈ RTp[|σz|+2].
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Definition 5. A process z is becomes fully corrupt at i if exists a node σz ∈ Σ that is fully corrupt, |σz| = i and for
every previous node |σ′z| < i, node σ′z is not fully corrupt.
The following is immediate from the definitions above.
Claim 4. If process z becomes fully corrupt at i then of all the nodes of Σ that end with z only nodes of round i and
i+ 1 can be fully corrupt.
Proof. By definition of fully corrupt, all correct processes will have z ∈ F in round i + 2. So in that round and later
all nodes will put ⊥ in RT for z.
Let CT , the corrupt tree, be a dynamic tree structure. CT is the tree of all fully corrupt nodes (note that due to
coloring, the set of fully corrupt nodes is indeed a tree). We denote by CT[i] the state of CT at the end of round i. By
the definition of fully corrupt, at round i we add nodes of length i− 2 to CT .
We label the nodes in CT as follows: a node σz ∈ CT is a regular node if process z becomes fully corrupt at |σz|
and σz ∈ CT is a special node if process z becomes fully corrupt at |σz| − 1.
Let αi denote the distinct number of processes that become fully corrupt at round i. For convenience, define
α0 = 0 (this technicality is useful in Lemma 7). Let A = α0, α1, . . . be the sequence of counts of process that
become fully corrupt in a given execution.
Following the approach of [GM98], we define wastei = (
∑
j≤i αi)− i. So wastei is the number of processes that
became fully corrupt till round i minus i (the round number). The following claim connectswastei to ∩p∈GFA[i+3]p
the set of fully detected corrupt processes at round i+ 3.
Claim 5. For any round 4 ≤ r ≤ t+ 1, and any correct process we have |FA[r]| ≥
∑
j≤r−3 αi.
Proof. By the definition of z becoming fully corrupt at i, all correct processes will have z ∈ F in round i+ 2. Due to
the gossiping of F , all correct processes will have z ∈ FA in round i+ 3.
So if wastei ≥ 6 then in round r = i + 3 we will have
(∑
j≤i αi
)
− i ≥ 6 so by Lemma 5 for each correct
process we have |FA[r]| ≥ r + 3. In this case all correct processes will start in the associated monitor sequence the
next protocol with initial value BAD and the protocol and monitor sequence and global protocol will reach agreement
and halt on BAD by round i+ 6 (by Lemma 1).
We will now show that if the adversary maintains a small waste (less than 6 by the argument above, but this will
work for any constant) then the CT tree must remain polynomial sized.
The following key lemma shows that the adversary cannot increase the number of leaves by “cross contamination”.
In more detail, if the adversary causes two fully corrupt processes at round i1 followed by a sequence of rounds with
exactly one fully corrupt process at each round followed by a round with no fully corrupt process at that round then
this action essentially keeps the tree CT growing at a slow (polynomial) rate. We note that the focus on “cross
contamination” follows the approach of [GM98]. But they only verify the case of two fully corrupt followed by a
round with no fully corrupt. We have identified a larger family of adversary behavior that does not increase the waste
(in the long run). Our proof covers this larger set of behaviors and this requires additional work.
Lemma 5. Assume 0 < i1 < i2 such that αi1 = 2, αi2 = 0 and for all i1 < i < i2, αi = 1 then for any
σ ∈ Σi1−1 ∩ CT it is not the case that there exists σpτ ∈ Σi2+1 ∩ CT and there exists σqτ ∈ Σi2+1 ∩ CT (so there is
at most one extension). Moreover the size of the subtree starting from σp or σq and ending in length i2+1 is bounded
by O((i2 − i1)2).
See the additional analysis in Section 5.1.
To bound the size of CT , we partition the sequence A = α0, α1, . . . by iteratively marking subsequences using the
following procedure. For each subsequence we mark, we prove that it either causes the tree to grow in a controllable
manner (so the ending tree is polynomial), or it causes the tree to grow considerably (by a factor of O(n) ) but at the
price of increasing the waste by some positive constant. Since the waste is bounded by a constant, the result follows.
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1. By Lemma 7 we know that if A contains a 0(1)∗0 (a sequence starting with 0 then some 1’s then 0) then it
contains it just once as a suffix of A. Moreover, this suffix does not increase the size of the tree by more than
O(n). Let A1 be the resulting unmarked sequence after marking such a suffix (if it exists).
2. Mark all subsequences in A1 of the form 2(1)∗0 (a sequence starting with 2 then some 1’s then 0). By Lemma 5
each such occurrence will not increase the number of leafs in CT (but may add branches that will close whose
total size is at most n2 over all such sequences). Let A2 be the remaining unmarked subsequences.
3. Mark all subsequences in A2 of the form X(1)∗0 where X ∈ {3, . . . , t} (a sequence starting with 3 or a larger
number followed by some 1’s then 0). By Lemma 8 each occurrence of such a sequence may increase the size of
the tree multiplicatively by O(n) leafs and O(n2) non-leaf nodes, but this also increases the waste by c−1 > 1
(where c is the first element of the subsequence). Observe that the remaining unmarked subsequences do not
contain any element that equals 0. Let A3 be the remaining unmarked subsequences.
4. Mark all subsequences of the form Y (1)∗ where Y ∈ {2, . . . , t} (a sequence whose first element is 2 or a larger
number followed by some 1’s but no zero at the end). Again, by Lemma 8 each such occurrence may increase
the size of the tree by O(n) leafs and O(n2) non-leafs, but this also increases the waste by c > 1. Let A4 be
the remaining unmarked.
5. Since A3 contains no element that equals zero and we removed all subsequences that have element of value 2 or
larger as the first element then A4 must either be empty or A4 is a prefix of A of the form (1)∗ (a series of 1’s ).
Since it is a prefix of A then a sequence of 1’s keeps at most one leaf. So the tree remains small.
Thus, the size of CT is polynomial, which by Lemma 6 bounds the size of IT . This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
5.1 Additional Analysis
The following lemma bounds the size of IT as a function of the size of CT times O(n7).
Lemma 6. If σ ∈ IT and |σ| > 7 then there exists σ′ ❁ σ with |σ′| ≥ |σ| − 7 such that σ′ ∈ CT .
Proof. Seeking a contradiction let σ = σ′τ be of minimal length such that σ ∈ IT , |σ| > 7, |τ | = 7 and there does
not exist σ′τ ′ ∈ CT such that τ ′ ⊑ τ .
Let w be the first element in τ so σ′w ⊑ σ′τ then since σ′w /∈ CT then by definition, some correct process will
have σ′w ∈ RT [|σ′w|+2]. By Theorem 2 statement 4 all correct processes will have σ′w ∈ RT [|σ′|+5 and will close
the branch σ′w by round |σ′|+ 6 (see DECAY RULE) a contradiction to the assumption that σ ∈ IT and |τ | = 7.
The following lemma shows that the protocol stops early if the adversary causes two rounds with no new fully
corrupt and only one fully corrupt per round between them.
Lemma 7. If exists 0 ≤ i1 < i2 such that αi1 = 0, αi2 = 0 and for all i1 < i < i2, αi = 1 then all processes will
halt by the end of round i2 + 5.
Proof. The only fully corrupt process that can appear in round i1+1 is the new one from αi1+1 = 1 (because αi1 = 0
and a process can be as a node in CT for only two rounds starting from the first round it is fully corrupt). A simple
induction shows that at round i1 + j only the new fully corrupt node of round i1 + j can appear. Once we reach round
i2 then no node can be fully corrupt so all branches will close and all processes will halt by the end of round i2+5.
We now prove the main technical result of this section Lemma 5. It shows that having two fully corrupt then a
series of one fully corrupt then a round with no fully corrupt does not increase the number of leafs in the tree. This
can add some non-leaf nodes to the tree, but the overall addition of such nodes is bounded by a multiplicative factor
of O(n2) over all such sequences.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let processes p, q be the two that become fully corrupt at i1. We begin with the case that i2 = i1+1
such that there is no process that becomes fully corrupt at i2. Consider any σ ∈ CT where |σ| = i1− 1. The following
is the subtree of σ ∈ CT that we will analyze:
28
σp
q
q
p
The following analysis for process p shows that either σp or σq or σqp will quickly be in RT . Note that this
implies that p, q can extend any node σ ∈ CT into at most one node of length i2 in CT .
Let correctDetector be the set of correct processes that detect σp via the Not Voter detection rule in round |σp|+1.
Let correctVoter be the remaining correct processes (that are not in correctDetector). Note that by definition of Not
Voter, the value of all those in correctVoter must be the same. Let d be this value.
For each σpu ∈ Σ with u 6= q we have that σpu /∈ CT (because αi1 = 0). So σpu ∈ RT [|σpu| + 2] for
some correct processes and hence their value is fixed (otherwise σp ∈ RT and we are done) and all correct processes
will have σpu ∈ RT[|σp| + 5]. Let faultyEcho be the set of corrupt children of σp whose value is fixed to d. Let
faultyEchoOther be the remaining corrupt process that are children of σp whose value is fixed to 6= d. Note that σp has
n− |σp| children of which all but child σpq must be fixed. Hence |faultyEcho |+ |faultyEchoOther | ≥ n− |σp| − 1.
There are three cases to consider:
Case 1: If |correctV oter|+ |faultyEcho| ≥ n− t− 1 then σp ∈ RT [|σp|+ 5] for all correct processes since all
these n− t− 1 children of σp will appear in RT [|σp|+ 5] and so σp ∈ RT [|σp|+ 5] using the RELAXED RULE.
Otherwise, |correctV oter|+|faultyEcho | ≤ n−t−2 so it must be that |correctDetector|+|faultyEchoOther| ≥
t+ 1 − |σp| = t + 2− |σpq|. This is because σp has n− |σp| children and each one of them except of child q must
fix their value in RT [|σp|+ 3].
Case 2: If |correctDetector| ≥ t + 2 − |σpq| then SPECIAL-BOT RULE will fire on the level i1 + 1 node σqp.
This will occur because all other children of σq are not fully corrupt - hence will appear in RT [|σq| + 5]. The only
case in which SPECIAL-BOT RULE may not fire is if in the meantime σq ∈ RT in which case we are done.
Case 3: It must be that correctDetector ≤ t, hence correctVoter ≥ t + 1 on value d (because σ contains no
correct process). Since correctV oter ≥ t + 1 then all correct processes will see that σp is leaning towards d (see
definitions 3. and 4. in the fault detection rules).
For any w ∈ faultyEchoOther , since w does not become fully corrupt at i1 or i1 + 1 it must be that are at least
t + 1 correct processes that are children of σpw that hear from σpw a value d′, d′ 6= d. So the conditions of Not
Masking for σpw hold.
This implies that w is ‘forced’ to send ⊥ for σqpw to all correct processes. For if w sends d′ 6= ⊥ to any correct
processes for σqpw then by Not Masking rule at round |σpw|+2 = |σqpw|+1 these correct processes will detect w
as corrupt and in the same round mask σqpw to ⊥.
Therefore there will be |correctDetector|+ |faultyEchoOther| ≥ t+2− |σqp| children of σqp that will appear
in IT with value ⊥ and since there is no process that becomes fully corrupt at i1 + 1 = i2 then all other children of
σq must appear in RT [|σq| + 5]. So the SPECIAL-BOT RULE will fire on the level i1 + 1 node σqp. This completes
the proof for the case i1 − i2 = 1.
We can now consider the case where i1 − i2 > 1. The key observation is that the above argument required two
properties for a process z that becomes fully corrupt at round i. The first is that all the level i nodes of the form σz
have all their children (except one) fixed to some value. The second is that the level i + 1 nodes of the form σ′z have
the property that all other children of σ′ are fixed.
Intuitively, if a child σzu is fixed to the majority value of σz then σzu will help fix σz using the relaxed rule.
Otherwise, σzu is fixed to some d′, which implies that at least t + 1 correct processes received d′ from σzu. Hence
σzu must be a masker for the round i+ 1 node σ′z.
Next we observe the structure of CT given a sequence with i1− i2 > 1. Let p, q be the two processes in i1, let ℓ =
i2− i1 +1 and denote by x3, . . . , xℓ the remaining fully corrupt by order of appearance. Using an inductive argument
one can show that any CT graph will be a subgraph of the following: for every node σ ∈ CT of length i1 − 1 there
will be two branches that we call special branches. These branches will be σpqx3 . . . xℓ and σqpx3 . . . xℓ. Observe
that these branches contain only special nodes. In addition, there will be regular branches as follows: σpx3 . . . xℓ,
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σqx3 . . . xℓ, σpqx4 . . . xℓ, σqpx4 . . . xℓ, . . .σpqx3 . . . xixi+2 . . . xℓ, σqpx3 . . . xixi+1 . . . xℓ, . . . , σpqx3 . . . xℓ−2xℓ,
σqpx3 . . . xℓ−2, xℓ. Observe that all these regular branches contain regular nodes and that all their children will be
fixed due to round i2 having no fully corrupt process. The number of regular branches is O(i2 − i1) and the length of
each branch is bounded by O(i2 − i1).
σ
p
q
x3
x4
x5
x5
x4
x5
x3
x4
x5
q
x3
x4
x5
p
x4
x5
x3
x5 x4
x5
The above tree is an example for i2 − i1 = 4. The two special branches are the rightmost and leftmost paths. All
other leafs are the endpoints of all the regular branches. Observe that given one more fully corrupt, each special branch
is split into two branches, one extends the original special branch and the other is a new regular branch that continues
as a path. Also observe that one more fully corrupt will simply extend the path of each regular branch by one.
As all the regular branches will have all their children fixed, they cannot be used as leafs to extend the tree. Since
there are O(i2 − i1) regular branches and each of them is of length at most O(i2 − i1) then the total amount of nodes
added in this process is O((i2− i1)2) per each leaf in CT of length i1− 2. So if the size of the tree without this subtree
is x then the total number of non-tree nodes added by these types of sequences is at most O(xn2) (this is a crude
bound that can be improved).
We now need to show that at least one of the special branches gets fixed. Since all the regular branches cannot
expand, our goal is to prove that it cannot be the case that both special branches are not fixed (in the i1 − i2 = 1 the
analogue is that either σpq or σqp is fixed). Given the key observation and the structure statement we can now apply
a similar argument as we did for p in the i1 − i2 = 1 case. We start with xℓ and going towards p, q. We will show that
in each iteration on level i we either fix one of the special branches (and we are done) or we have sufficient conditions
to use main argument on level i− 1.
For the base case, consider xℓ. Because i2 = 0 then all the level i1 + ℓ − 2 nodes of the form σ′xℓ (for any
σ′) have all their children fixed. So we can apply the main argument: if all these level i1 + ℓ − 2 nodes get fixed
using the RELAXED RULE then all the regular branches ending with xℓ−1 have all their children fixed and the two
special branches ending xℓ−1 each have their parent with xℓ−1 as a only child. Therefore we continue by induction.
Otherwise, by the argument above, all the level i1 + ℓ − 2 + 1 nodes of the form σ′xℓ (for any σ′) will be fixed
SPECIAL-BOT RULE. In particular this includes the special branch. So we are done.
For the general case, we assume that all level i1 + j − 2 nodes of the form σ′xj (for any σ′) have all their children
fixed and that for the two special branches, the parents of xj have xj as their only child. Again we can apply the
ii − i2 = 1 arguments: If all these level i1 + j − 2 node get fixed using the RELAXED RULE then we continue by
induction to j − 1. Otherwise, by the argument above, all the level i1 + j − 2 + 1 nodes of the form σ′xℓ (for any
σ′) will be fixed by the SPECIAL-BOT RULE. In particular this includes the special branch. So we are done since the
special branch is fixed
The following lemma shows that having a large number (3 or more) of processes becoming fully corrupt at a given
round, followed by a sequence of 1’s and then maybe followed by 0 does increase the number of leafs considerably.
Note that if αi1−1+αi1 ≥ 6 then the monitor process will cause the protocol to reach agreement and stop in a constant
number of rounds. So we only look at the case that αi1−1 + αi1 < 6.
Lemma 8. If 2 < αi1 , αi1−1 + αi1 < 6, αi2 ∈ {0, 1} and for all i1 < i < i2, αi = 1 then for any σ ∈ Σi1−1 ∩ CT
there are at most O(i2 − i1) nodes of the form στ ∈ Σi2+1 ∩CT . Moreover the size of the subtree starting from σ and
ending in length i2 + 1 is bounded by O((i2 − i1)2).
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Proof. Using an overly pessimistic argument, every node σ ∈ Σi1−1 ∩ CT can have at most αi1−1 · αi1 ≤ 16 = O(1)
nodes of length i1 + 2 in CT . Even if each such node is a special node then after O(i2 − i1) rounds of just one fully
corrupt each round, each such node of length i1 + 2 will generate at most O(i2 − i1) regular branches, each is a path
with at most O(i2 − i1) nodes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we resolve the problem of the existence of a protocol with polynomial complexity and optimal early
stopping and resilience. The main remaining open question is reducing the complexity of such protocols to a low
degree polynomial. Another interesting open problem is obtaining unbeatable protocols [CGM14] (which is a stronger
notion than early stopping).
We would like to thank Yoram Moses and Juan Garay for insightful discussions and comments.
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